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THE SOUTHWESTERN SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Vol. XVI

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No. 2

CONTENTS

	PAGE
WORLD CHAOS ONCE MORE - - - - - DEAN C. S. POTTS	1
SOME DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF KANSAS - - - - - CARROLL D. CLARK AND ROY L. ROBERTS	11
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE NEW DEAL - - - ROGER W. SHUMATE	30
ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN FOR THE COLONIZATION OF MEXICO - - - - - SIMON J. ELLISON	42
OUR NEW LINE OF FEDERALISM - - - - - STUART A. MCCORKLE	53
ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND SECURITY - - - - - KARL E. ASHBURN	61
BOOK REVIEWS - - - - - EDITED BY O. DOUGLAS WEEKS	69

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THE SOUTHWESTERN SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

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THE QUARTERLY

Vol. XVI

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WORLD CHAOS ONCE MORE*

BY C. S. POTTS, DEAN

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I

At the outbreak of the Great War, Lord Bryce declared that civilization must destroy war or war would destroy civilization. The truth of that statement has been brought home to every thinking man as he has, with the passing years, more completely realized the appalling results of the war and of the multitude of disasters throughout the world that have followed in its wake. In Europe the governments of half the belligerents either crashed completely or underwent profound transformations whose ultimate results cannot yet be adequately measured. The financial and business structure of many nations collapsed and millions of their people were left without means of support, to become both a burden and a danger to national security. Even in America, though far removed from the scene of conflict, we have seen the law obstructed, and the lives of honest, fearless judges threatened by angry mobs. Many millions of our people have been saved from starvation or revolution by the dole or what is equivalent to it, and the security of our social order is at this moment threatened by the Sinclairs, the Townsends, the Coughlins, and the Huey Longs, whose patent nostrums, however visionary, find instant support among the hungry and the desperate. At this moment 22,000,000 people or nearly one-fifth of our population are still on the relief rolls and Congress has just scraped the bottom of the Federal meal barrel

*Presidential address delivered before the joint session of the Southwestern Social Science Association on Friday evening, April 19, 1935.

to give the President the \$4,880,000,000 he demanded. Under these distressing conditions, who among us can foresee at this time what the 1936 election will bring forth, if our present frantic efforts to lift ourselves from chaos should fail?

In view of this situation, one feels justified in believing that another such war, if it should come in the near future, would bring utter ruin to our entire economic, governmental, and social structure. The thousands who raised the cry of "bread or blood" and joined in the rush from Paris to Versailles, a century ago, might be replaced by hundreds of thousands of gaunt, hungry men, women, and children in the chief cities of the world, and the earth would be drenched with fratricidal blood. Ultimately the dictator would arise to bring order out of chaos. Against such a cataclysm, our country is no more secure than the leading nations of Europe.

Such a picture is so lurid that one is tempted to charge it up to an overwrought imagination. To be conservative let us subdue the colors and cover up the livid hues of fratricidal gore. But even so, the most conservative among us, will agree that another world war would bring unspeakable calamities upon the race and would endanger all that we count most essential to human happiness and well-being.

Toward such a calamity the nations of the world now seem pretty definitely headed. Although only seventeen years have passed since the signing of the armistice, and the debris of the titanic struggle has not yet been fully cleared away, the peoples of the world are today in a panic of fear, and are re-arming in feverish haste. Even before Hitler scrapped the Versailles treaty by the recent avowal of his purpose to re-arm, the peoples of the world were definitely in the grip of the old, pre-war psychology, the age-old illusion that the route to peace is to prepare for war. The state of the public mind a year ago is vividly told in the following headlines taken at random from the newspapers of that time: "French Government Acts to Strengthen Military Defenses;" "France to Have 6,000 Airplanes by End of Year;" "Parity in Air is British Goal; will not Accept Inferiority in Face of U. S., Russian and Japanese Expansion;" "Senate Votes Authorization for Big Navy; 1,000 More Planes; Estimates of Cost Vary from \$470,000,000 up to \$750,000,000;" "World Spending more Today on Armaments than Before the War."

Such were the unmistakable signs a year ago that the nations had again placed their feet upon the path whose end I fear is Armageddon. What was then foreshadowed burst full upon a

startled world, with Hilter's open defiance and his demand for the annexation of Austria and Memel. And now all pretense is dropped and the nations are openly entering the greatest armament race the world has yet seen. Ruled by fear and immemorial hatred of their neighbors the powers are emptying their treasuries for the training of armies and for the purchase of implements of destruction.

The extent of these financial drains on the resources of the nations is appalling. In spite of the unemployment and distress everywhere prevalent, the seven leading nations are this year spending for arms and armaments a sum well over \$5,000,000,000 and have a total of more than three million men in their standing armies, permanently withdrawn from productive labor. And it is quite clear that these figures will be far exceeded during the coming fiscal year. It is significant that, although we Americans are very ready to criticise the peoples of Europe for not patching up their differences and using the money they are wasting on armaments in paying their war debts to us, we ourselves though vastly less vulnerable to attack than any other major country, are at this moment planning to spend in preparation for war an estimated total of from \$800,000,000 to \$1,000,000,000, or an increase of from 60% to 90% over the expenditures for the current year.

II

When the great conflagration broke over Europe twenty-one years ago, the whole world stood aghast at what was passing before its eyes. So long had peace prevailed that it seemed impossible to believe that a great war machine was actually rolling over peace-loving Belgium, that men were being butchered by thousands, and that tens of thousands of women and children were being driven from their homes without food or shelter. And then as the weeks grew into months and the months passed into years, and still the butchery continued, the newspaper press of all countries and thinking men everywhere began to say to themselves, "This terrible thing must never happen again." But how could it be prevented? Some said that the rulers and statesmen who started the war should be held personally responsible with their lives, and a great cry went up in the allied countries to "hang the Kaiser." Others thought that the profits should be taken out of war, and still others that the private manufacture of arms and munitions should be forbidden.

In the midst of all the turmoil, men began more clearly to see that the condition that had theretofore prevailed in international

affairs corresponded closely to the anarchy that was supposed to have prevailed in Rousseau's mythical "state of nature," wherein each man was a law unto himself and everyman's hand was against his neighbor. Just as laws and sheriffs and courts had brought order out of chaos in national affairs, so it was believed that laws and courts and sheriffs would bring order out of the chaos that existed in international affairs.

The idea of some sort of world organization was not new. Had not the Roman Empire ruled the known world? Even in the Middle Ages the idea of a universal state and a universal church seemed to be embodied in the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy. In modern Europe, the nations had on occasion found it necessary or desirable to act in unison. The Congress of Westphalia, in 1648, had brought peace to Europe and rearranged the boundaries after the disastrous Thirty Years' war. A similar function had been performed by the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, and by the Congress of Berlin, in 1878. Still later the two Peace Conferences at the Hague, in 1899 and 1907, had sought means of checking the alarming increase of armaments, the earlier Conference resulting in setting up the International Court of Arbitration, and the later one, in laying plans for an International Court of Justice, which since the war, we have seen embodied in the Permanent Court of International Justice, commonly called the World Court.

The moving spirit in the second Peace Conference at the Hague was the great Theodore Roosevelt. He now became the leading American advocate of international coöperation as the only escape from international anarchy. Four years before the outbreak of the war, in his address at Christiania, upon receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, he spoke as follows:

Finally, it would be a master stroke if those great Powers honestly bent on peace would form a League of Peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others. The combination might at first be only to secure peace within certain definite limits and certain definite conditions; but the ruler or statesman who should bring about such a combination would have earned his place in history for all time and his title to the gratitude of all mankind.

When the war broke out he wrote a number of magazine articles on the great struggle, in one of which, called "Utopia or Hell," he had the following to say:

The horror of what has occurred in Europe, and which has drawn into the maelstrom of war large parts of Asia, Africa, Australasia, and even America, is altogether too great to permit us to rest supine without endeavoring to prevent its repetition. We are not to be excused if we do not make a resolute and intelligent effort to devise some scheme which will minimize the chance for a recurrence of such horror in the future and which will at least limit and alleviate it if it should occur. In other words, it is our duty to try to devise some efficient plan for securing the peace of righteousness throughout the world.

Many other leading Americans became advocates of a League of Peace. Among them were such men as Elihu Root, former Presidents Eliot and Lowell of Harvard, Senator Lodge, Senator Knox, and General Nelson A. Miles. Former President Taft became president of a large and active organization, known as the League to Enforce Peace, and more than once he toured this country in behalf of that proposal.

Thus the leading thinkers in this country came to see clearly that the world was at the parting of the ways—at the close of the war it must either return to the international anarchy that had previously existed, with each nation pursuing its own devices in its own way, with an unavoidable renewal of the competition in armaments, or the nations must form some sort of international organization, with power to settle international disputes and to bring to bear upon the disputants the force of the united public opinion of mankind, and in extreme cases to use the economic or military forces of the united powers to enforce their common will upon a disturber of the peace.

It is not my purpose to tell the story of how President Wilson became a convert to the idea of international coöperation, and succeeded in giving it concrete form in the treaty of peace. Nor is it desirable even if time permitted to tell the story of the struggle in this country to get it adopted. Suffice it to say that had there been less narrow partisanship on the one side and less pig-headedness and pride of authorship on the other, in all probability we would have joined hands in this promising attempt to substitute law for war.

The significant thing for us now is that two roads lay open before us—one leading back into the morass of international anarchy from which we had come and in which we now once again find ourselves floundering, while the other held out a hope that mankind might find a rational way to settle disputes without a resort to arms. It was one of those tragic moments in the history of the world in which hesitation is fatal, but a bold decision leads so success and determines the destiny of mankind for decades to come. In that great crisis, unfortunately, our country, whose wealth and power and prestige were then at the zenith and whose geographical position and disinterestedness made her the natural and indispensable leader in any plan for world cooperation, hesitated, debated interminably, and finally slipped involuntarily into the road that led back into anarchy. I say America slipped involuntarily, for it was never her deliberate choice. It came about as a result of our constitutional provision placing control in treaty matters in the hands of one third of our senators. This provision enabled the die-hands and isolationists, the troglodytes of the Twentieth Century, led in the Senate by Lodge who for partisan reasons had changed his position on the league question and Borah and Hiram Johnson, and, without the Senate, by William Randolph Hearst, to thwart the will of the majority and make America the lone wolf in international affairs.

This attitude of aloofness was most unfortunate, and has made America a stumbling block in the path of progress. In all important matters the nations represented in the League have had to stop in their deliberations to enquire what the attitude of America on the matter in hand might be. Thus, when the League of Nations proposed that England permit her fleet to be used, if need should arise, to enforce the decisions of the League and of the World Court, England replied that she dare not do it so long as America with a fleet of equal strength could not be counted on to cooperate in the measures taken. Again when three years ago Japan began her aggressive campaign against China, the countries of Europe refused to apply against her the economic sanctions provided for in the Covenant of the League, giving as one reason for their decision that there was no way to anticipate what action America would take and unity of action in such matters was necessary to success. Again, in England's recent "White Paper" setting forth the causes that have induced her greatly to increase her budget for armaments, she cited the fact that America, as well as Germany and Japan, was largely increasing its naval and air forces, thus endangering

England's safety. Indeed in the matter of armaments, America, instead of taking advantage of her position of relative security and urging a conservative policy on other nations, has become one of the worst sinners and is planning during the coming fiscal year to spend more money on preparation for war than any other nation, with the possible exception of Russia.

As a result of our refusal to cooperate in international matters, and of our vigorous naval and air policy, combined with Germany's recent action, the world now is girdled with a circle of fear. Our arming, even though wholly defensive, frightens England and Japan; Japan's preparations, equally defensive she claims, frightens us and gives Russia and England the jitters; Russia's arming strikes terror to the hearts of Japan in the East, and Poland and Germany in the West; while Germany's mailed fist has caused the mobilization, it is said, of 600,000 Italians, brought thousands of French troops scurrying to the Rhine boundary, and has given Londoners visions of air raids ten times more deadly than those of the last war.

I hope the troglodytes, who had their way sixteen years ago and succeeded in keeping America out of the League, and more recently out of the World Court, are thoroughly pleased with the resulting anarchy and the overwhelming burden of armaments which their policy of isolation and extreme nationalism has brought upon us. Personally, I should not like to have on my shoulders their responsibility for the present situation and for the future calamities which may grow out of it.

No doubt you are asking if there is any way to avoid the impending disaster. I do not think any one is wise enough to answer that question. Certainly I am not. We have traveled so far along the road of anarchy that it will be with the greatest difficulty that we retrace our steps. I am convinced that no one wants war now or during the next five years. Possibly no nation will ever deliberately choose war. But the world, and especially the European world, is rapidly becoming an armed camp, a powder magazine, and a spark, such as the assassination at Sarajevo twenty-one years ago, may produce an explosion that will involve us all in disaster.

Of one thing I feel pretty certain, and that is that further doses of isolation and nationalism, fortified by larger armies and navies and more deadly instruments of destruction, will not solve the problem. As already pointed out, such efforts by one nation

only call for an answer in kind from all others, and the armament race goes on to the point of bankruptcy or war, or both.

Another thing that appears to me to be utterly hopeless is for any nation, as America for example, to withdraw from the world and attempt to live the life of a hermit. Chinese walls are not only out of style, they are useless. We tried that policy during the Napoleonic wars and the embargo we levied not only brought ruin to a great section of the country and gave rise to the Hartford Convention and the first talk of secession from the Union, but in the end failed to keep us out of the war. And it should not be forgotten that prior to the recent war, our country had stayed at home strictly and attended to its own business, as the isolationists insist it should now do, and that no ruler ever labored more diligently than President Wilson did to keep his country out of war. And yet, in spite of these favorable conditions, we became involved in the struggle.

Furthermore, the whole current of history is against the isolationists. In the future our contacts with the outside world are destined to be vastly more numerous and intimate than ever before. The great ocean liners have cut the time to Europe to four days. We sit in our homes and listen to programs of music and addresses in London and Berlin, and even now the great air companies are testing their planes in trial flights in the West Indies preparatory to establishing regular mail and passenger service across the oceans east and west. One would think that even a cave man could see that all the forces of science and invention are against him and that the earth shrinks in size with each setting sun.

Nor can we expect to find more than temporary relief in making more treaties. We have industriously piled treaty on treaty since the close of the war—the Treaty of Versailles, the Three Power Pact, the Nine-Power agreement, the Locarno Pact, the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and now the proposed Eastern Locarno Pact—but they do not bring us permanent peace and security. The reason is to be found in the fact that there are still nations and peoples that regard treaties as scraps of paper when they conflict with national interest. Hitler's recent repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles had a precedent in Japan's treatment of the Nine-Power Pact for the open door in Manchuria, and in her virtual annexation of the mandated islands after her repudiation of the League's Covenant. I would not have you conclude from this statement that I condemn Hitler out of hand. On the contrary, I think his action was inevitable and the only question was when

it would come. Germany had agreed to the treaty under compulsion, and the allied powers had for fifteen years utterly failed to perform their part under the treaty and disarm or even reduce their armaments. Under such circumstances no great nation would consent to remain disarmed for an indefinite period. My object in mentioning the repudiation of the treaties by Germany and Japan is to show that treaties are a rope of sand when vital national interests are at stake. Instead of depending on treaties that seek to bind nations for a long period of years, we must have machinery for constant treaty making and treaty modification; instead of the dead hand of formal treaties, the living process of consultation and adjustment to changing circumstances as they arise—like driving a car—a constant process of adjustment to changing grades and curves.

Treaties, then, may save us for a time, but they certainly offer no permanent solution of the problems of peace and security. The only hope I can see is for the nations of the world to turn once more to the idea of world cooperation. For America this will involve an about face and a retracing of the steps that have led us to our present position of isolation. A first step would seem to be the reestablishment of international trade and commerce. That would call first for getting rid, in some fashion, of the worthless war debts owed us. They have not been paid and never will be, and our attempt to keep them alive only serves as a barrier to trade and to the most cordial relations with the debtor nations. Then we should join with the nations in reducing tariff barriers and quotas and exchange difficulties, keeping ever before our eyes the simplest of all principles of international trade—that they who would sell must also buy. In addition to these efforts to re-establish friendly commercial relations, our government should embrace every opportunity to cooperate with other nations in reducing the causes of friction and distrust among the nations, and in solving the problems that endanger the peace of the world.

I am profoundly convinced that world peace can only be achieved by a conscious, determined and a long-continued effort to find causes of agreement and friendly cooperation with our neighbors, little and big, and by minimizing both at home and abroad the causes of friction. Peace will proceed only from a deep and abiding desire for peace and an understanding of the feelings, the fears, and the traditions of other peoples. Governments, in my judgment, should undertake systematic campaigns to educate their peoples in international good will and neighborliness. The saber-

rattling of a Mussolini or a Hilter may be a useful device to rally voters or to unify public opinion behind a wavering cause, but it is destructive of the friendly feeling for neighboring peoples on which alone the structure of permanent peace can be built.

Would I have America join the World Court? Yes. And the League of Nations? Yes, and every other organization or movement that has as its object the substitution of reason for force. Sir Edward Gray, England's great minister for foreign affairs, declared that he could have prevented the outbreak of war if he could have gotten the diplomats of the opposing nations together around a table. I would make very sure that such a table is at hand should another such crisis arise, and that the nations are accustomed to sitting around it in a friendly discussion of their common problems.

SOME DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF KANSAS*

CARROLL D. CLARK AND ROY L. ROBERTS
University of Kansas

The present paper reports a few preliminary steps in a larger enterprise, sponsored by the Kansas State Planning Board, that aims to make available in usable form a considerable body of data bearing upon the growth, composition, movements, and adjustments of the population of Kansas. Early in the undertaking it was concluded that regional approach which would, on the one hand, orient the state with respect to the larger region of which it is a part, and, on the other, focus intensively upon the sub-regions within its boundaries, might best serve the major purposes for which the study was planned. However, space limits permit the presentation here of only a small part of the data thus far assembled. Therefore, it will be necessary to confine our report to data showing certain demographic characteristics of the state as a whole.

Physiographic and Climatic Factors. The distribution, adjustment, and probable future growth of the population must be studied in relation to the physiographic factors that condition these tendencies. The area of the State, a nearly perfect rectangle extending 420 miles east and west and 200 miles north and south, lies in the great plains territory that slopes from the hills of the Rocky Mountains to the Mississippi-Missouri River basin. The land surface gently declines from an altitude of 4,000 feet on the western border to less than 800 feet at the eastern boundary, a slope that averages about eight feet to the mile. This sloping land surface is drained by two major watersheds, the Kansas and the Arkansas river systems. Much of the best farm land in the State lies in the broad alluvial valleys of these rivers and their tributaries.


There are no geographic barriers within the State to interfere appreciably with the free movement of population or with the flow of social contacts. The "Great American Desert," long regarded as an almost impregnable barrier, became a highway for migration and an open-sesame to the land-hungry settler, once the pioneer trails and railroads penetrated the virgin soil.

*Paper read before the Sociology Section of the Southwestern Social Science Association, Oklahoma City, April 20, 1935.

The eastern part of the State is well-watered country of meandering streams, fertile valleys, and occasional sharp limestone escarpments. Most of the mineral resources of the State, except oil and salt, are found in the southeastern corner of the State. The Flint Hills in the central parts of the State provide rich bluestem pastures for a profitable grazing industry. The uplands and prairies that make up the rest of this central area, comprise one of the greatest wheat-raising sections of the country. This section also has important mineral resources in the form of oil and salt. The western part of the State is called the High Plains region, and consists of broad rolling prairies. Precariously watered by occasional springs and coulees, this vast buffalo grass rangeland is more naturally suited to grazing than to cultivation. Dry-farming methods, however, have been applied on a wide scale throughout this section in recent years.

Climate conditions, and particularly rainfall, combine with these physiographic characteristics to produce marked differences in the demographic characteristics of the various sections of the State. In fact, these differences are so great that it is impossible to understand adequately the characteristics, composition, and growth trends of the population, unless one sees them against the background of the natural areas or geographic sub-regions of the State. For instance, the significance of the curve of population growth for Kansas is largely concealed as long as only the figures for the State as a whole are considered, but it is immediately revealed when the population is grouped into three sub-regions and the rate of increase, density, and per cent of the State's total population in each of the sub-regions are compared. These shall be referred to as the Eastern, Central, and Western Sub-regions (see Fig. 1). An examination of the Insert Fig. 1 data shows how exceedingly different has been the rate of growth in these parts of the State. The figures reveal that in the settlement of Kansas there were three great forward waves of settlement and one pronounced backward wave. The first forward wave began during the Territorial period and was confined at first chiefly to the eastern portion. Six-sevenths of the population in 1860 was in the Eastern Sub-region and the remaining one-seventh confined to the Central Sub-region. During the first decade of statehood this wave continued and swelled over into the Central Sub-region. The second forward wave was launched, following a series of years of plentiful rainfall in the Seventies and Eighties. This rush of settlement first engulfed the Central Sub-region, which showed a

FIGURE 1.



decennial increase of 424 per cent in 1870 and 489 per cent in 1880. It soon overflowed into the Western Sub-region, which grew at an amazing rate between 1875 and 1890. This optimistic rush of migration carried the population far beyond what was at that time the geographic limit of safe agriculture. The normal aridity of the "short-grass country" soon began to starve out thousands of these settlers, and even whole communities. The backward wave is revealed in the actual decrease in the population of the Central Sub-region and the Western Sub-region between 1890 and 1900, 1.6 and 10.6 per cent, respectively. The final forward movement was less a wave, perhaps, than a steady tide. With the introduction of drought-resisting crops and dry-farming technique, the two western sub-regions again began to grow after 1900 and maintained a faster rate of increase than the Eastern Sub-region.

Growth of the Population. The settlement of Kansas began soon after the passing of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854. The principle of "squatter sovereignty," established in that act, produced a sectional struggle in which Kansas was the stake, to be won by the side which could establish the most residents within her borders. In the race of immigration that ensued, the North rapidly outdistanced the South, partly as the result of the activities of such organizations as the New England Emigrant Aid Society. Kansas was admitted as a free state in 1861. The population at the time of the first State Census¹ in 1855 was 8,601. At the time of the first Federal Census in 1860 the population was 107,206, and during the next three decades settlement continued at an extremely rapid rate. That this rapid growth did not start until after the Civil War is indicated by the fact that the State Census¹ in 1865 reported a population of only 135,807 whereas the population according to the Federal Census of 1870 was 364,399. Table I gives the population by census decades, the increase of each decade over the preceding one, and the population per square mile. The per cent of increase was 239.9 in 1870, 173.4 in 1880 and 43.4 in 1890, but fell to 3.0 in 1900. In 1910 the rate of growth accelerated, rising to 15.0 per cent, but declined again to 4.6 per cent in 1920. The per cent of increase in 1930 was 6.3, another slight acceleration. The average density was only 1.3 per square mile in 1860, but more than tripled again during the

¹Fourth Annual Report of the Kansas State Board of Agriculture, 1875, p. 67.

second decade. Since 1890 the net increase in population, and hence the growth in average density, has been small as compared with the first three decades in the State's history.

TABLE I Population, Amount and Per Cent of Increase and Density for Kansas, 1860 to 1930.(a)

Year	Total Population	Increase Over Preceding Decade		Population per Square Mile
		Number	Per Cent	
1860	107,206			1.3
1870	364,399	257,193	239.9	4.5
1880	996,096	631,697	173.4	12.2
1890	1,428,108	432,012	43.4	17.5
1900	1,470,495	42,387	3.0	18.0
1910	1,690,949	220,454	15.0	20.7
1920	1,769,257	78,308	4.6	21.6
1930	1,880,999	111,742	6.3	23.0

(a) Adapted from U. S. Census, 1930, *Population*, Vol. 1, Kansas table 1, p. 399.

Figure II shows the trend of growth for Kansas, the United States, the West North Central and the West South Central Divisions plotted on a semi-logarithmic scale. Tables Ia, Ib, and Ic, give by decennial periods the population, the per cent of increase, and the density for the United States as a whole, the West North Central Division, the West South Central Division, and for the states of Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. This data makes possible some interesting comparisons. The rate of growth for the West North Central Division, which


TABLE Ia Population, Per Cent of Increase, and Density for the United States, West North Central and West South Central Divisions, by Decades, 1860 to 1930.(a)

Year	United States			West South Central Div.			West North Central Div.		
	Population	Per Cent Increase	Pop. Per Sq. M.	Population	Per Cent Increase	Pop. Per Sq. Mile	Population	Per Cent Increase	Pop. Per Sq. Mile
1860	31,443,321	35.6	10.6	2,169,832	143.5	5.4	1,747,667	85.9	(b) ---
1870	38,558,371	22.6	13.0	3,856,594	77.7	9.7	2,029,965	16.2	(b) ---
1880	50,155,783	30.1	16.9	6,157,443	59.7	15.0	3,334,220	64.3	(b) ---
1890	62,947,714	25.5	21.2	8,932,112	45.1	17.5	4,470,983	42.2	11.0
1900	75,994,575	20.7	25.6	10,347,423	15.8	20.3	6,532,290	37.8	15.2
1910	91,972,266	21.0	30.9	11,637,921	12.5	22.8	8,784,534	34.5	20.4
1920	105,710,620	14.9	35.5	12,544,249	7.8	24.6	10,242,224	16.6	23.8
1930	122,775,046	16.1	41.3	13,296,915	6.0	26.0	12,176,830	18.9	28.3

(a) Adapted from U. S. Census Reports on Population, 1910, Vol. I, table 10, p. 30; table 11, p. 31, table 23, p. 42; 1920, Vol. I, table 8, p. 20, table 9, p. 22, table 16, p. 29; 1930, table 5, p. 10, table 6, p. 12, table 7, p. 13.

(b) Not available.

Figure 2



includes Kansas, greatly exceeded the rate for the United States from 1860 to 1890, but has fallen decidedly below the latter since that time. The West South Central Division, which includes the greater part of the Southwestern Region, grew at a more rapid rate than the United States in every decennial period except the one ending in 1870. The recent growth trend (last two decades) of Kansas closely resembles that of Missouri, while its earlier growth trend (first three decades) resembles that of Oklahoma since the opening of that State to settlement. In general, it may be said that the present rate of population growth in Kansas compares favorably with the other states of the West North Division, but lags considerably behind that of the states in the West South Central Division.

TABLE Ib Population, Per Cent of Increase, and Density for Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma by Decades, 1860 to 1930. (a)

Year	Kansas			Missouri			Oklahoma		
	Population	Per Cent Increase	Pop. Per Sq. Mile	Population	Per Cent Increase	Pop. Per Sq. Mile	Population	Per Cent Increase	Pop. Per Sq. Mile
1860	107,206	—	1.3	1,182,012	73.3	17.2	—	—	—
1870	364,399	239.9	4.5	1,721,295	45.6	25.1	—	—	—
1880	966,096	173.4	12.2	2,168,380	26.0	31.6	—	—	—
1890	1,428,108	43.4	17.5	2,679,185	23.6	39.0	(b) 258,657	—	3.7
1900	1,470,495	3.0	18.0	3,106,665	16.0	45.2	790,391	205.6	11.4
1910	1,690,949	15.0	20.7	3,293,335	6.0	47.9	1,657,155	109.7	23.9
1920	1,769,257	4.6	21.6	3,404,055	3.4	49.5	2,028,283	22.4	29.2
1930	1,880,999	6.3	23.0	3,629,367	6.6	52.8	2,396,040	18.1	34.5

(a) From special compilation made for this study from data in U. S. Census Reports on Population for the years indicated.

(b) First census taken in 1890.

TABLE Ic Population, Per Cent of Increase, and Density for Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana, by Decades, 1860 to 1930. (a)

Year	Texas			Arkansas			Louisiana		
	Population	Per Cent Increase	Pop. Per Sq. Mile	Population	Per Cent Increase	Pop. Per Sq. Mile	Population	Per Cent Increase	Pop. Per Sq. Mile
1860	604,215	184.2	2.3	435,450	107.5	8.3	708,002	36.7	15.6
1870	818,579	35.5	3.1	484,471	11.3	9.2	726,915	2.7	16.0
1880	1,591,749	94.5	6.1	802,525	65.6	15.3	939,946	29.3	20.7
1890	2,235,527	40.4	8.5	1,128,211	40.6	21.5	1,118,588	19.0	24.6
1900	3,048,710	36.4	11.6	1,311,564	16.3	25.0	1,381,625	23.5	30.4
1910	3,896,542	27.8	14.9	1,547,449	20.0	30.0	1,656,388	19.9	36.5
1920	4,663,228	19.7	17.8	1,752,204	11.3	33.4	1,798,509	8.6	39.6
1930	5,824,715	24.9	22.2	1,854,482	5.8	35.3	2,101,593	16.9	46.3

(a) From special compilation made for this study from data in U.S. Census Reports on Population for the years indicated.

Rural and Urban Population Trends. Kansas is predominantly a rural state, but during the seventy years of its history covered by census data, the proportion of its urban population has increased and that of its rural population has declined at a fairly steady and uniform rate.

Due to the fact that the various decennial censuses have employed several definitions of the rural and urban categories, their rural-urban classifications cannot be used to give a consistent picture of long-time trends without some reclassification. The current definition of rural and urban population, which classes as urban those living in incorporated places of 2,500 or more inhabitants and as rural those living outside such places, was not established until the census of 1910. (Classification on this basis was, however, later carried back to 1880.) Therefore, to supply consistent trends for the State, the population of every county in Kansas was reclassified according to this rural-urban definition for all the census years not already worked out on this basis. Table II gives the rural and urban population of the State, the per cent of their increase over the preceding decade, and the per cent each are of the total state population, for each census year from 1860 to 1930.

TABLE II Rural and Urban Population, Per Cent of Increase, and Per Cent of Total Population for Kansas, By Decades, 1860 to 1930.(a)
(Per cent not shown where less than 0.1)

State of Kansas						
Year	Rural Population	Percent Increase	Percent Total Population	Urban Population	Percent Increase	Percent Total Population
1860	97,161	—	90.6	10,045	—	9.4
1870	312,529	221.7	85.8	51,870	416.4	14.2
1880	891,140	185.1	89.5	104,956	102.3	10.5
1890	1,155,907	29.7	80.9	272,201	159.4	19.1
1900	1,139,592	-1.4	77.5	330,903	21.6	22.5
1910	1,197,159	5.0	70.8	493,790	49.2	29.2
1920	1,151,293	-4.0	65.1	617,964	25.2	34.9
1930	1,151,165	—	61.2	729,834	18.1	38.8

(a) From a special reclassification of the population according to the U. S. Bureau of Census current definition of urban-rural population, which classes as urban those living in incorporated places of 2,500 or more inhabitants and as rural those living outside of these places.

The rural population has declined from 90.6 per cent of the total in the State in 1860 to 61.2 per cent in 1930. The only interruption of this downward movement occurred in 1880, when the rush of farmward settlement into the western half of the

State caused a temporary reversal of the trend. Making a liberal allowance for natural increase, it appears that more than half a million rural inhabitants settled in Kansas during the Seventies, by far the majority of whom moved into the eastern half of the State. Since 1890 the rural population of the State as a whole remained practically static. The largest numerical gains were made to the urban population in the decades ending in 1890 and in 1910. About 165,000 inhabitants were added to the urban population in both these decades. Most of the urban population is found in the Eastern and Central Sub-regions. None of the population of the Western Sub-region was classified as urban until 1900.

Changes in the rural-farm, the rural-nonfarm, and the urban farm population from 1920 to 1930 (the only data available) are shown in Table III. The rural-farm decreased from 735,884 in 1920 to 704,601 in 1930, a loss of 31,283, while the rural non-farm increased from 415,409 in the former year to 446,564 in the latter, a gain of 31,155. In other words, the static picture of the rural population, as a whole, is preserved by the small-village population growing enough to offset almost exactly the loss suffered by the farm population. The urban-farm population was 1,493 in 1920 and increased to 2,595 in 1930, a number still too small to be of great significance.

TABLE III Kansas Urban and Rural Population Changes, 1920 to 1930.(a)
(Per cent not shown where less than 0.1)

Class	1920 (Jan. 1)	Per Cent of State Population	1930 (April)	Per Cent of State Population	Increase, 1920 to 1930	
					Number	Per Cent
TOTAL	1,769,257	100.0	1,880,999	100.0	111,742	18.1
Urban	617,964	34.6	729,834	38.8	111,870	6.3
Urban-farm	1,493	0.1	2,596	0.1	1,102	73.8
Rural	1,151,293	65.1	1,151,165	61.2	-128	-----
Rural-farm	735,884	41.6	704,601	37.5	-31,283	-4.3
Rural non-farm	415,409	23.6	446,564	23.7	31,155	7.5

(a) Adapted from U. S. Census, 1930, *Population*, Vol. III, Part I, Kansas, table I, p. 821.

Trends in Age and Sex Composition. The trends of population increase and geographical shiftings in the foregoing discussion have been accompanied by highly important changes in the basic character of the population, particularly in the age and sex composition. Table IV show the total population of the State

TABLE IV Population of Kansas, by 5-Year Age Periods and Per Cent Distribution, 1870 to 1930. (a)
(Per cent not shown where less than 0.1)

Age	Total Population						Per Cent Distribution								
	1870	1880	(c) 1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1920
All ages	364,399	996,096	1,427,096	1,470,495	1,690,949	1,769,257	1,880,999	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5	59,446	151,704	185,531	172,122	191,519	187,262	171,094	16.3	15.2	13.0	11.7	11.3	10.6	10.6	9.1
5-9	46,902	140,095	186,350	172,340	177,868	185,270	190,343	12.9	14.1	13.1	11.7	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.1
10-14	41,753	120,464	170,215	168,277	168,309	179,311	181,034	11.5	12.1	11.9	11.4	10.0	10.1	9.6	9.6
15-19	33,598	96,310	155,600	157,579	170,503	162,691	174,573	9.2	9.7	10.9	10.7	10.1	9.2	9.3	9.3
20-24	41,427	98,570	133,799	140,110	167,584	153,256	162,439	11.4	9.9	9.4	9.5	9.9	8.7	8.6	8.6
25-29	36,971	82,165	109,948	117,860	144,369	144,593	140,513	10.1	8.2	7.7	8.0	8.5	8.2	7.5	7.5
30-34	28,427	71,665	100,485	98,811	122,416	130,159	131,853	7.8	7.2	7.0	6.7	7.2	7.4	7.0	7.0
35-39	23,576	63,133	83,958	87,695	110,242	123,052	132,451	6.5	6.3	5.9	6.0	6.5	7.0	7.0	7.0
40-44	16,679	47,887	70,659	78,408	91,054	104,261	120,437	4.6	4.8	5.0	5.3	5.4	5.9	6.4	6.4
45-49	12,273	41,826	68,337	67,474	79,921	94,425	107,622	3.4	4.2	4.8	4.6	4.7	5.3	5.7	5.7
50-54	9,367	30,402	52,918	59,221	73,257	79,010	95,816	2.6	3.1	3.7	4.0	4.3	4.5	5.1	5.1
55-59	5,657	20,009	38,538	49,665	55,682	63,001	78,789	1.6	2.0	2.7	3.4	3.3	3.6	4.2	4.2
60-64	4,046	14,650	28,957	37,505	46,493	55,482	63,848	1.1	1.5	2.0	2.6	2.7	3.1	3.4	3.4
65-69	2,232	8,694	18,836	27,729	38,454	40,395	49,727	0.6	0.9	1.3	1.9	2.3	2.3	2.6	2.6
70-74	1,214	4,771	11,670	17,209	24,854	29,939	37,791	0.3	0.5	0.8	1.2	1.5	1.7	2.0	2.0
75-79	516	2,390	6,024	9,443	14,876	20,621	23,039	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.2
80-84	204	(b) 1,361	2,613	4,134	6,620	9,241	12,431	0.1	(b) 0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.7
85-89	59	—	903	1,364	2,402	3,553	5,077	—	(d) 0.1	(d) 0.1	(d) 0.1	(d) 0.2	(d) 0.3	(d) 0.3	(d) 0.3
90-94	19	—	221	362	589	782	1,150	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
95-99	13	—	56	86	115	166	201	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Over 100	8	—	27	46	46	50	52	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Unknown	12	—	1,451	3,055	3,776	2,737	719	—	—	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	—

(a) Compiled from U. S. Census Reports on Population for the years indicated.

(b) 80 years and over.

(c) 1,012 Indians not included because of inadequate data.

(d) Includes ages 85 years and over.

classified by 5-year age periods and by sex for the census years 1870¹ to 1930.

Space is not available here for a detailed analysis of these extremely significant data; therefore, our comments must be confined to a brief summarization of the outstanding trends. In general, the trend may be described as a change from a youthful to a middle-aged population. Since 1860 there has been a steady shrinking in the percentage of the population under 5 years of age and since 1910 there has been an absolute decrease of approximately 20,000, despite the steady increase in the total population. With only three slight exceptions the percentage in the age groups 5 to 19 inclusive has declined since 1880, and since 1910 the percentage of those under 30 years of age has declined. On the other hand, the age groups over 40, with only two slight exceptions, have shown a steady tendency to increase over the entire period. In 1920 the proportion of the Kansas population in age groups over 50 was 17.3 per cent, as compared with 15.4 per cent in the United States as a whole, and with only 11.6 per cent in the state of Texas. However, this narrowing at the base of the population pyramid and broadening at its top is a phenomenon that is general throughout the United States, and the changes in Kansas are remarkable only with respect to the speed that marked their occurrence.

Data showing the age distribution of the urban, rural-farm, and rural-nonfarm populations make possible another line of useful comparisons. Here the trend in percentage age distribution cannot be carried back of 1920 because the rural-farm and rural-nonfarm distinction was not established by the Federal Census before that time. Tables V, VI, and VII show the rural-farm, rural-nonfarm and urban populations for 1920 and 1930 classified by 5-year age periods, by sex, and by per cent distribution.

The most striking characteristic of the rural-farm population is the disproportionate numbers in the age groups under 20, while that of the rural-nonfarm population is the large proportion in the age groups over 60. Thus it will be observed from these tables that the predominance of old people in the rural population as compared with the urban arises from the fact that these old folks are concentrated in the villages and hamlets that make up the nonfarm class. The rural-farm class has a smaller percentage in the

¹The table showing the population for 1860 is not included because the same age groups cannot be obtained.

old-age brackets than the urban class. The excess of young people in the rural population, however, arises chiefly from the rural-farm class. The urban population is characterized, as is generally true of this class, by disproportionate numbers in the age groups between 20 and 60.

TABLE V Rural-farm Population of Kansas, by 5-Year Age Periods, by Sex, and by Per Cent Distribution for 1920 and 1930. (a)

Age	Population						Per Cent Distribution					
	1920			1930			1920			1930		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
All ages	735,884	389,735	346,149	704,601	375,047	329,554	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5	89,851	45,854	43,997	71,275	36,240	35,035	12.2	11.8	12.7	10.1	9.7	10.6
5-9	87,864	44,790	43,074	79,971	41,257	38,714	11.9	11.5	12.4	11.3	11.0	11.7
10-14	85,396	44,333	41,063	80,568	41,856	38,712	11.6	11.4	11.9	11.4	11.2	11.7
15-19	73,822	38,943	34,879	74,098	39,956	34,142	10.0	10.0	10.1	10.5	10.7	10.4
20-24	60,617	31,460	29,157	56,340	30,612	25,728	8.2	8.1	8.4	8.0	8.2	7.8
25-29	55,368	28,775	26,593	44,310	22,972	21,338	7.5	7.4	7.7	6.3	6.1	6.5
30-34	50,582	26,140	24,442	43,647	21,985	21,662	6.9	6.7	7.1	6.2	5.9	6.6
35-39	47,590	24,884	22,706	45,904	23,683	22,221	6.5	6.4	6.6	6.5	6.3	6.7
40-44	41,159	21,906	19,253	43,816	22,869	20,947	5.6	5.6	5.6	6.2	6.1	6.4
45-49	36,839	20,356	16,483	39,348	20,912	18,436	5.0	5.2	4.8	5.6	5.6	5.6
50-54	30,416	17,220	13,196	35,414	19,524	15,890	4.1	4.4	3.8	5.0	5.2	4.8
55-59	24,071	13,870	10,201	28,886	16,620	12,266	3.3	3.6	2.9	4.1	4.4	3.7
60-64	20,157	12,333	7,824	22,487	13,287	9,200	2.7	3.2	2.3	3.2	3.5	2.8
65-69	13,213	8,012	5,201	16,289	10,044	6,245	1.8	2.1	1.5	2.3	2.7	1.9
70-74	8,782	5,291	3,491	11,276	6,935	4,341	1.2	1.4	1.0	1.6	1.8	1.3
75-79	5,726	3,213	2,513	6,076	3,593	2,483	0.8	0.8	0.7	1.0	1.0	0.8
80-84	2,738	1,417	1,321	3,139	1,813	1,326	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4
85 and over	1,379	724	655	1,648	823	825	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3
Unknown	364	214	150	109	66	43	0.1	---	---	---	---	---

(a) Adapted from U. S. Census, 1930, Population, Vol. II, tables 31 and 32 pp. 704 and 720.

TABLE VI Rural-nonfarm Population of Kansas by 5-Year Age Periods, by Sex and by Per Cent Distribution for 1920 and 1930.(a)

Age	Population						Per Cent Distribution					
	1920			1930			1920			1930		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
All ages	415,409	213,656	201,753	446,564	229,841	216,723	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5	40,841	20,657	20,184	39,252	20,059	19,193	9.8	9.7	10.0	8.8	8.7	8.9
5-9	41,386	20,815	20,571	42,633	21,720	20,913	10.0	9.7	10.2	9.5	9.5	9.6
10-14	39,701	19,416	20,285	39,371	19,843	19,528	9.6	9.1	10.1	8.8	8.6	9.0
15-19	35,332	17,073	18,259	37,616	18,274	19,342	8.5	8.0	9.1	8.4	8.0	8.9
20-24	35,585	18,662	16,923	37,956	19,169	18,787	8.6	8.7	8.4	8.5	8.3	8.7
25-29	33,288	17,316	15,972	34,477	17,702	16,775	8.0	8.1	7.9	7.7	7.7	7.7
30-34	29,275	15,028	14,247	31,661	16,900	14,761	7.0	7.0	7.1	7.1	7.4	6.8
35-39	27,855	14,651	13,204	30,930	16,629	14,301	6.7	6.9	6.5	6.9	7.2	6.6
40-44	23,781	12,439	11,342	27,200	14,470	12,730	5.7	5.8	5.6	6.1	6.3	5.9
45-49	21,671	11,414	10,257	24,481	12,920	11,561	5.2	5.3	5.1	5.5	5.6	5.3
50-54	18,561	9,970	8,591	22,621	12,006	10,615	4.5	4.7	4.3	5.1	5.2	4.9
55-59	15,697	8,020	7,677	19,772	10,343	9,429	3.8	3.8	3.8	4.4	4.5	4.4
60-64	15,619	8,246	7,373	16,820	8,488	8,332	3.8	3.9	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.8
65-69	12,615	6,314	6,301	14,523	7,304	7,219	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.3
70-74	10,555	5,629	4,926	12,143	6,284	5,859	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.7	2.7	2.7
75-79	7,768	4,529	3,239	7,972	4,050	3,922	1.9	2.1	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.8
80-84	3,303	1,899	1,404	4,556	2,335	2,221	0.8	0.9	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.0
85 and over	1,527	846	681	2,336	1,207	1,129	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5
Unknown	1,049	732	317	244	128	106	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	—	—

(a) Adapted from U. S. Census, 1930, Population, Vol. II, tables 31 and 32, pp. 704 and 720.

TABLE VII Urban Population of Kansas, by 5-Year Age Periods, by Sex, and by Per Cent Distribution for 1920 and 1930.(a)

Age	Population						Per Cent Distribution					
	1920			1930			1920			1930		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
All ages	617,964	305,830	312,134	729,834	356,403	373,431	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5	56,570	28,623	27,947	60,567	30,922	29,645	9.2	9.4	9.0	8.3	8.7	7.9
5-9	56,020	27,985	28,035	67,739	33,845	33,894	9.1	9.2	9.0	9.3	9.5	9.1
10-14	54,214	26,618	27,596	61,095	30,435	30,660	8.8	8.7	8.8	8.4	8.5	8.2
15-19	53,537	24,925	28,612	62,859	29,741	33,118	8.7	8.1	9.2	8.6	8.3	8.9
20-24	57,054	26,618	30,436	68,143	31,402	36,741	9.2	8.7	9.8	9.3	8.8	9.8
25-29	55,937	26,968	28,969	61,726	29,097	32,629	9.1	8.8	9.3	8.5	8.2	8.7
30-34	50,302	24,777	25,525	56,545	27,504	29,041	8.1	8.1	8.2	7.7	7.7	7.8
35-39	47,607	24,362	23,245	55,617	27,308	28,309	7.7	8.0	7.4	7.6	7.7	7.6
40-44	39,321	19,561	19,760	49,421	24,342	25,079	6.4	6.4	6.3	6.8	6.8	6.7
45-49	35,915	18,575	17,340	43,793	21,749	22,044	5.8	6.1	5.6	6.0	6.1	5.9
50-54	30,033	15,699	14,334	37,781	19,043	18,738	4.9	5.1	4.6	5.2	5.3	5.0
55-59	23,233	12,004	11,229	30,131	15,033	15,098	3.8	3.9	3.6	4.1	4.2	4.0
60-64	19,706	9,979	9,727	24,541	12,091	12,450	3.2	3.3	3.1	3.4	3.4	3.3
65-69	14,567	7,222	7,345	18,915	9,302	9,613	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.6
70-74	10,652	5,326	5,326	14,372	6,947	7,425	1.7	1.7	1.7	2.0	1.9	2.0
75-79	7,127	3,587	3,540	8,991	4,169	4,822	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3
80-84	3,200	1,511	1,689	4,736	2,158	2,578	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7
85 and over	1,645	751	894	2,496	1,123	1,373	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4
Unknown	1,324	739	585	366	192	174	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	—	—

(a) Adapted from U. S. Census, 1930, Population, Vol. II, tables 31 and 32, pp. 704 and 720.

A comparison of the percentage age distributions of these three classes for 1920 with the percentages for 1930, shows that the urban, rural-farm, and rural-nonfarm are all subject to the same general trend, viz., a decrease in the percentages of the younger age brackets and an increase at the upper end of the scale. The declining birth rate of the rural population, strongly emphasized by rural sociologists as a nation-wide phenomenon, is sharply reflected in these data for Kansas. In 1920 the age group under 15 comprised 35.7 per cent of the rural-farm population; in 1930 the same group comprised only 32.8 per cent. During the same period the age group under 15 years fell off from 29.4 per cent in the rural-nonfarm population of the State. The decline in the percentage of the corresponding group in the urban population was from 27.1 in 1920 to 26.0 in 1930. Thus it appears that the rural population is moving in the direction of stabilized population pyramid even more rapidly than the urban population.

The age distribution of the male and female populations of the State likewise affords some interesting comparisons. With very few exceptions, the female percentages in the age periods under 35 years exceed the corresponding male percentages for each census year since 1900. The male percentages are almost without exception larger for the age periods over 35 years. Tables VIII and IX give the distribution for the male and female populations from 1870 to 1930. From these tables it will be observed that the excess of the female percentages over the male was confined to the age periods below 20 in 1870 and 1880, and below 25 in 1890.

Equally interesting is the trend in the sex ratio and the differences in sex ratios within the urban and rural classes of population. Table X shows the sex composition of the State for each census year since 1860. The sex ratio (males per hundred females) has declined somewhat unevenly from 123.2 in 1860 to 104.5 in 1930.

The marked difference between the urban, rural, rural-farm and rural-nonfarm sex ratios are illustrated in Tables XI and XII. The data for the urban and rural ratios can be obtained only for the years 1900 to 1930; the rural-farm and rural-nonfarm data is available only for 1920 and 1930. The urban ratio is consistently lower than the rural. In 1930 there were 95.4 males per hundred females in the cities as compared to 110.7 males per hundred females in the rural districts. The rural-farm population has a greater proportion of males than the village or rural-nonfarm groups. In 1930 the rural-farm ratio was 113.8 while the rural-nonfarm ratio was 106.1.

TABLE VIII Population of Kansas, by Sex and 5-Year Age Periods, for the Decades, 1870 to 1930. (a)

Age	Male						Female							
	1870	1880	(c) 1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1870	1880	(c) 1890	1900	1910	1920	1930
All ages	202,224	536,667	752,112	768,716	885,912	909,221	961,291	162,175	459,429	674,984	701,779	805,037	860,036	919,708
Under 5	30,200	77,171	94,631	87,251	96,970	95,134	87,221	29,246	74,533	90,900	84,871	94,549	92,128	83,873
5-9	23,872	71,348	94,465	87,500	89,758	93,590	96,822	23,030	68,747	91,885	84,840	88,110	91,680	83,521
10-14	21,504	62,714	87,311	85,413	85,169	90,367	92,134	20,249	57,750	82,904	82,864	83,140	88,944	88,900
15-19	17,258	49,547	78,896	79,951	87,235	80,941	87,971	16,340	46,763	76,704	77,628	83,268	81,750	86,602
20-24	24,593	54,118	69,463	71,823	87,617	76,740	81,183	16,834	44,452	64,336	68,287	79,967	76,516	81,256
25-29	22,081	46,023	58,440	60,947	76,077	73,059	69,771	14,890	36,142	51,508	56,913	68,292	71,534	70,742
30-34	17,003	39,959	54,148	51,756	64,174	65,945	66,389	11,424	31,706	46,387	47,055	58,242	64,214	65,464
35-39	14,380	35,470	45,071	46,953	58,568	63,897	67,620	9,196	27,663	38,887	40,742	51,674	59,155	64,831
40-44	9,980	26,814	37,433	42,033	48,225	53,906	61,681	6,699	21,073	33,226	36,375	42,829	50,355	58,756
45-49	7,487	25,154	38,911	37,096	43,319	50,345	55,581	4,786	16,672	29,426	30,378	36,602	44,080	52,041
50-54	5,706	18,020	30,206	32,611	40,672	42,889	50,573	3,661	12,382	22,712	26,610	32,585	36,121	45,243
55-59	3,366	11,794	22,289	27,650	30,440	33,894	41,996	2,291	8,215	16,239	22,015	25,242	29,107	36,793
60-64	2,387	8,747	16,850	21,175	25,550	30,558	33,866	1,659	5,903	12,107	16,330	20,943	24,924	29,982
65-69	1,263	5,031	10,766	15,937	21,638	21,548	26,650	969	3,663	8,070	11,792	16,816	18,847	23,077
70-74	679	2,715	6,838	9,974	14,028	16,246	20,166	535	2,056	4,832	7,235	10,826	13,693	17,625
75-79	292	1,344	3,355	5,304	8,445	11,329	11,812	224	1,046	2,669	4,139	6,431	9,292	11,227
80-84	110	(b) 698	1,419	2,285	3,646	4,827	6,306	94	(b) 663	1,194	1,849	2,974	4,414	6,125
85-89	33	—	448	752	1,213	1,856	2,517	26	—	455	612	1,189	1,697	2,560
90-94	11	—	112	195	282	352	521	8	—	109	167	307	430	629
95-99	6	—	26	43	45	90	96	7	—	30	43	70	76	105
Over 100	4	—	9	18	20	23	19	4	—	18	28	26	27	33
Unknown	9	—	1,015	2,049	2,821	1,685	396	3	—	436	1,006	955	1,052	323

(a) Compiled from U. S. Census Reports on Population for the years indicated.

(b) 80 years and over.

(c) 1,012 Indians not included because of inadequate data.

TABLE IX Per Cent Distribution of the Population of Kansas by Sex, By 5-Year Age Periods, Decades, 1870 to 1930.(a)

(Per cent not shown where less than 0.1)

Age	Male							Female						
	1870	1880	1890 (c)	1900	1910	1920	1930	1870	1880	1890 (c)	1900	1910	1920	1930
All ages	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5	14.9	14.4	12.6	11.4	10.9	10.5	9.1	18.0	16.2	13.5	12.1	11.7	10.7	10.7
5-9	11.8	13.3	12.6	11.4	10.1	10.3	10.1	14.2	15.0	13.6	12.1	10.9	10.7	10.7
10-14	10.6	11.7	11.6	11.1	9.6	9.9	9.6	12.5	12.6	12.3	11.8	10.3	10.3	10.3
15-19	8.5	9.2	10.5	10.4	9.8	8.9	9.2	10.1	10.2	11.4	11.1	10.3	9.5	9.5
20-24	12.2	10.1	9.2	9.3	9.9	8.4	8.4	10.4	9.7	9.5	9.7	9.9	8.9	8.9
25-29	10.9	8.6	7.8	7.9	8.6	8.0	7.3	9.2	7.9	7.6	8.1	8.5	8.3	8.3
30-34	8.4	7.4	7.2	6.7	7.2	7.3	6.9	7.0	6.9	6.9	6.7	7.2	7.5	7.5
35-39	7.1	6.6	6.0	6.1	6.6	7.0	7.0	5.7	6.0	5.8	5.8	6.4	6.9	6.9
40-44	4.9	5.0	5.0	5.5	5.4	5.9	6.4	4.1	4.6	4.9	5.2	5.3	5.9	5.9
45-49	3.7	4.7	5.2	4.8	4.9	5.5	5.8	3.0	3.6	4.4	4.3	4.5	5.1	5.1
50-54	2.8	3.4	4.0	4.2	4.6	4.7	5.3	2.3	2.7	3.4	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.2
55-59	1.7	2.2	3.0	3.6	3.4	3.7	4.4	1.4	1.8	2.4	3.1	3.1	3.4	3.4
60-64	1.2	1.6	2.2	2.8	2.9	3.4	3.5	1.0	1.3	1.8	2.3	2.6	2.9	2.9
65-69	0.6	0.9	1.4	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.8	0.6	0.8	1.2	1.7	2.1	2.2	2.2
70-74	0.3	0.5	0.9	1.3	1.6	1.8	2.1	0.3	0.4	0.7	1.0	1.3	1.6	1.6
75-79	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.7	1.0	1.2	1.2	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.1	1.1
80-84	0.1	(b) 0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5
85 and over	---	---	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	---	---	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3

(a) Adapted from U. S. Census, 1930, *Population*, Vol. II, table 25, p. 63.

(b) 80 years and over.

(c) 1,012 Indians not included because of inadequate data.

TABLE X Population of Kansas, By Sex, with the Number of Males Per 100 Females, by Decades, 1860 to 1930.(a)

Year	Male	Female	Males Per 100 Females
1860	59,178	48,028	123.2
1870	202,224	162,175	124.7
1880	536,667	459,429	116.8
1890	752,647	675,461	111.4
1900	768,716	701,779	109.5
1910	885,912	805,037	110.0
1920	909,221	860,036	105.7
1930	961,291	919,708	104.5

(a) From special compilation made for this study from data in U. S. Census Reports on Population for the years indicated.

TABLE XI Urban and Rural Population of Kansas, by Sex, with the Number of Males Per 100 Females, by Decades, 1900 to 1930. (a)

Year	Urban Population		Rural Population		Males Per 100 Females	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Urban	Rural
1900	164,597	166,306	604,119	535,473	99.0	112.8
1910	249,509	244,281	636,403	560,756	102.1	113.5
1920	305,830	312,134	603,391	547,902	98.0	110.1
1930	356,403	373,431	604,888	546,277	95.4	110.7

(a) Adapted from U. S. Census on Population for the years indicated.

TABLE XII Rural-farm and Rural-nonfarm Population of Kansas, by Sex, with the Number of Males Per 100 Females, for 1920 for 1930. (a)

Year	Rural-farm Population		Rural-nonfarm Population		Males Per 100 Females	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Rural-farm	Rural-nonfarm
1920	389,735	346,149	213,656	201,753	112.6	105.6
1930	375,047	329,554	229,841	216,723	113.8	160.1

(a) Adapted from U. S. Census, 1930, Population, Vol. III, Kansas, table 2, p. 821.

Marked differences also appear in the sex ratio and age distribution of the three sub-regions mentioned in the first part of this paper. For instance, the sex ratio of the Eastern Sub-region, which was the first region of settlement and the first to become stabilized, had fallen to 110 by 1890; the Central Sub-region did not reach that level until 1900, and the Western Sub-region did not drop to that point until 1920. Even in 1930 the ratio for the Western Sub-region was still 110.0 while that of the central section had fallen to 102.9. The ratio for the Eastern Sub-region was 104.1. Some of the differences in the age distribution within the three sub-regions are indicated in Table XIII. Only 36.2 per

TABLE XIII Number and Per Cent Distribution, into Three Age Groups, of the Population of the Demographic Sub-regions of Kansas and 1930. (a)

Age	Sub-region I		Population Sub-region II		Sub-region III	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Under 20	284,800	36.2	303,628	38.0	128,616	43.4
20-64	441,159	56.1	440,853	55.2	151,756	51.2
65 and over	59,380	7.6	54,387	6.8	15,701	5.3

(a) From special compilation made for this study from data obtained from U. S. Census Population Reports.

cent of the population in the Eastern Sub-region are under 20 years of age, while 43.4 per cent of the Western Sub-region are in this group. The Central Sub-region, with 38.0 per cent in this group, more nearly resembles the Eastern Sub-region, than it does the Western. In the age group over 65 years of age the reverse is true. The Eastern Sub-region has 7.6 per cent of its population in this group, while in the Western Sub-region, which was the last to be settled, this group only accounts for 5.3 per cent of the population. The Central Sub-region has 6.8 per cent of its population in this group. There is also a difference in the 20 to 65 year age group. The percentage in the Eastern Sub-region is 56.1, in the Central 55.2, and in the Western 51.2.

Space forbids carrying further the analysis of the composition of the Kansas population. Neither is it within the scope of this paper to indicate or discuss the application of these and other facts, which will be presented later, to the enterprise of planning for the future development of agriculture, industry, and the various social institutions of the State. That must be left to the responsible agencies charged with that task.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE NEW DEAL

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The World War has had its economic and political repercussions throughout the entire world. For our part, the United States was jolted out of its traditional isolation, temporarily at least, and thrust prematurely into a position of world leadership. With a surprising burst of energy, great quantities of war materials were produced and millions of young men were hastily converted into soldiers and transported to foreign battlefields. The tempo of our national life was undoubtedly quickened by that effort. The war was followed by an industrial expansion which transformed us almost overnight from a predominantly rural and agricultural nation into one that is largely urban and industrial. This brought higher standards of living, and a tremendous increase in opportunities for travel and education. Yet, this apparent betterment of the lot of the masses was accompanied by an alarming concentration of wealth and economic power which inevitably intensified the incipient class struggle. When followed by a catastrophic depression, with untold miseries visited upon the unfortunate classes, this situation could scarcely fail to produce some striking changes in the American scene. It is in the light of this immediate background that we must view the New Deal, which may be said to be the American counterpart though a somewhat belated one, of the post-war revolutions that have swept over other lands. Perhaps we should say that it is a mere phase of the post-war American revolution, for who can say that it is more than a temporary rallying ground for the opposing political and economic forces?

The New Deal represents a groping toward a new social system and a new social philosophy, but despite its brain trust, it has not yet produced its philosopher. It is frequently disparaged on the ground that it is the product of the minds of a group of visionaries—men with fertile brains but no practical experience in government. It is true that the present Administration includes, or has included, both among its advisers and its administrative personnel, a number of professors and others who are thoroughly conversant with

political and economic theory, but they have not given us a consistent and coherent philosophy of government. Some of them have written thoughtful books and essays on current political issues, but if they have fitted their doctrines into an integrated theory of government and society, the present writer has been unable to discover it.

To say this is not to attack the Roosevelt Administration. Even its warmest defenders admit that the President has not envolved a single consistent program, and Dr. Raymond Moley goes so far as to say that only zealots and pedants would expect it of him.¹ At any rate, those who are acquainted with practical politics will not be surprised at a few inconsistencies. It must be remembered that the present Administration took office in the midst of the most disastrous depression thus far experienced by the American people. It was faced by a gang of brutal facts, not a bevy of beautiful theories. The President knew that his election was, at least in part, the result of a half-blind reaction against an economic situation that was growing intolerable. His most immediate task was in connection with relief and recovery, rather than with the reconstruction of a social system.² Of necessity, his first efforts were in the nature of patchwork reform and relief, rather than an attempt at an ultimate solution of the nation's problems. Furthermore, like any other man in a similar position, he has been forced, at times, into political expedients and compromises. The New Deal has been subjected to the interplay of pressure and influence from numerous special interest groups. It could scarcely be expected to steer a true course through the existing cross-currents of American life. But, in spite of the accusations of its enemies and the admissions of its friends, the writer feels that many of its implications in social theory are becoming apparent, and that a political philosophy is beginning to assume a more or less definite form.

In order to clarify our discussion, we must attempt something in the way of definition. The New Deal has been variously eulogized and stigmatized, but most writers upon the subject are content to assume that the term is understood, without defining it. One of its critics calls it "opportunistic empiricism" and "a series of uncoordinated measures of deficiteering, currency devaluation,

¹A. A. Berle, Jr., et al, a symposium "On Our Way—But Where are we Going?," *Saturday Review of Literature*, 10:625.

²It should be noted that the President himself considers the distinction between recovery and reform to be unwarranted. See his Message to Congress, Jan. 4, 1935.

dole and reform, (which) has been rationalized mainly by the use of two misleading words, 'recovery' and 'emergency'.³ Another refers to it as "a grotesque compound of false diagnoses and quack remedies,"⁴ while two others call it "planned sabotage" and "conscientious withdrawal of efficiency."⁵ Such comments might be multiplied almost endlessly, but they do not aid us in our task. They must be regarded more as partisan characterizations than as serious definitions.

In the months immediately preceding the Presidential election of 1932, the term 'New Deal' was frequently regarded as a mere campaign slogan, quite as meaningless, but serving the same political purpose, as 'The Full Dinner Pail' of previous campaigns. Others thought of it as the embodiment of the real but vaguely formulated hopes of the unfortunate and largely inarticulate classes for a better social and economic system. Finally, it was regarded as the campaign promises of President Roosevelt and his closest advisers. The President himself has defined it at one time as "plain English for a changed concept of the duty and responsibility of government toward economic life,"⁶ and at another time as a combination of the 'Square Deal' of Theodore Roosevelt and the 'New Freedom' of Woodrow Wilson.⁷ That is to say, he considers it as a partnership between government and business on one hand, and an expression of the principle that business should be subjected to drastic legal limitations, on the other hand, in order that its worst abuses may be prevented. Now, however, after two and a half years of practical application, the New Deal must be regarded simply as the record of the Roosevelt Administration in action, though it must still be interpreted in the light of the principles expounded by the men and women responsible for its policies.

It may be objected at the outset that our title, "The Political Philosophy of the New Deal," is a misnomer—that what we have to deal with here is economic, rather than political, doctrine. But to separate the economic from the political theories of the New Deal would be arbitrary and artificial. Not since the days of Hamilton, Jefferson and Madison—with the possible exception of

³Lawrence Dennis, "The Planless Roosevelt Revolution," *American Mercury*, 32:1.

⁴H. L. Mencken, "Notes on the New Deal," *Current History*, 40:521.

⁵J. B. Matthews and R. E. Shallcross, "Must America Go Fascist?" *Harper's*, 169:1.

⁶*Looking Forward*, p. 241.

⁷*On Our Way*, Foreword.

the Free Silver campaign of 1896—have economic issues been so frankly recognized as the basis of our political struggles. To be sure, there are still some who try to place their theories on high moral ground, divorced from economic or class interests, and to make the issue appear as that of human liberty in the abstract, but the lines are being ever more sharply drawn. Even the eternal verities of "individualism" and "human liberty" advocated by the critics of the New Deal now stand clearly revealed as the mere political projection of an economic system—if the species of economic anarchy involved in non-regulation and non-planning can properly be called a system.

Historically, most of American political thought seems to have centered around the nature of the Union and the interpretation of the Constitution. Speculation of this sort has become rather barren in recent years, but it still serves the purposes of political pleaders. It is one of the interesting paradoxes of our day that the strict constructionist, states' rights party of Thomas Jefferson, John C. Calhoun and Jefferson Davis now wishes to treat the Constitution as a "broad highway to progress," while the loose constructionist, unionist party of Alexander Hamilton, John Marshall and Abraham Lincoln is demanding strict construction and states' rights. This conflict, however, is largely incidental and superficial. The protagonists of the New Deal necessarily demand a liberal interpretation of the Constitution, otherwise many of their policies will be—as some already have been—broken on the rocks of legality. The Old Dealers, on the other hand, fall back upon the doctrine of strict construction and states' rights as a convenient and effective means of discrediting policies which are anathema because of their economic implications. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court make it obvious that the arguments over constitutionality cannot be ignored, but insofar as they are used to attack or defend the policies of the present Administration, they are little more than false faces for conflicting views on social and economic questions. One must look further for the basic philosophy of the New Deal.

In the first place, the prevailing mood of the New Deal is one of optimism. It is not the expansive optimism of the formative years of American history which found expression in the bombastic phrase "Manifest Destiny." It is not the fatuous optimism of the post-war decade which was well represented by Mr. Arthur Brisbane's oft-repeated slogan "never sell America short," nor is it the wishful thinking brand of optimism embodied in Mr.

Hoover's unfortunate prognostication "prosperity is just around the corner." In short, it is not optimism of any of our standard brands, but it certainly presents a clear-cut contrast to the fatalistic pessimism into which the country was rapidly sinking at the time the present Administration took office. That is to say, it denies the pessimistic assumption that depressions are inevitable, that they just happen of themselves, or come from some superior force outside of society, and are not in any way to be attributed to the defects of the social system itself, and that when they come, they and their attending miseries are to be borne in patience, somewhat as our medieval ancestors endured the plagues, without doing anything about them. It repudiates the notion that all human effort to prevent or relieve depressions is as futile as attempting to stay the sun or tide. It is here, perhaps, that we find the sharpest break with our political thought of the recent past.

It follows from the preceding paragraph that the fundamental assumption of the New Deal is the intellectualistic one that economic and social forces can be controlled and directed in the interest of human society. It refuses to recognize our political and economic machinery as a Frankenstein monster destined to destroy those who created it. It takes sharp issue with the recent pronouncement of Mr. Henry Ford that what government does is of little significance one way or the other,⁸ and it offers a direct challenge to the fatalism of the previous Administration. It denies the contention that the economic laws under which we have supposedly been operating are natural, immutable and eternal. The Roosevelt Administration cannot be said to have originated this idea, by any means, but its program certainly represents the most ambitious attempt in American history to relieve economic distress and to better the lot of the masses through governmental action. To its fatalistic adversaries, it must appear as audacious as would a modern Joshua in bidding the Sun to stand still.

The New Deal has often been called a planless revolution.⁹ Mr. John T. Flynn says that we have merely relinquished the philosophy of Messrs. Hoover, Mellon *et al*, without embracing any other,¹⁰ and Mr. H. L. Mencken alleges that it is no more

⁸An interview, "Thinking Out Loud," *American Magazine*, Oct., 1934.

⁹Lawrence Dennis, "The Planless Roosevelt Revolution," *American Mercury*, 32:1.

¹⁰"American Revolution; 1933," *Scribner's*, 94:1.

planned than a dog fight.¹¹ These remarks, however, seem ill-advised. One may easily argue that its planning is not thoroughgoing enough, that it is not consistent or effective, or even that planning itself is not desirable, but to deny that the Roosevelt program contains the elements of a planned society seems futile. The very assumption that economic factors are subject to political control implies some kind of planning, or "regimentation" as its enemies would say. Furthermore, the efforts of the National government to conserve natural resources, to reduce cotton and wheat acreage, curtail the production to current needs, along with its attempts to establish minimum wages and maximum hours of work, and to abolish child labor and eliminate unfair competition in industry, are obviously parts of a larger social plan, whether a wise one or not.

The Roosevelt program is clearly Utilitarian in purpose, though its Utilitarianism is not of the individualistic character generally associated with John Stuart Mill. That, of course, would not permit a strict regulation of trade and industry. The President, to be sure, affirms his Utilitarianism in terms made familiar by the Mill school of thought: "Every government policy should first be laid against the specification of the greatest good for the greatest number of individual men and women,"¹² and "... the liberty of individuals to carry on their business should not be abrogated unless the larger interests of the many are concerned."¹³ But he extends his views of what concerns the many much farther than did Mill: "Good government should maintain the balance where every individual may find safety if he wishes it, where every individual may attain such power as his ability permits, consistent with his assuming the accompanying responsibility,"¹⁴ and "it is the purpose of government to see that not only the legitimate interests of the few are protected but that the welfare and rights of the many are conserved."¹⁵ Thus, we have what might be called a twentieth century Utilitarianism, as distinguished from that of the middle nineteenth century.

It follows from the foregoing discussion that the New Deal with its belief in the positive rather than the negative rôle of government in the affairs of men, assumes the organic nature of

¹¹"Notes on the New Deal," *Current History*, 40:521.

¹²*Looking Forward*, p. 193.

¹³*Ibid.*, 139.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 139.

society, in that it recognizes the mutual interdependence of both individuals and of nations. It sees society as an organism into which each cell must fit, and the health of which depends upon the proper functioning of all of its members—one in which no member can be injured without the whole body being affected. In the words of one of its leading exponents, "there is no prearranged field of government which is set apart from the circumstances of those who are governed. Relations here are always interdependent."¹⁶

President Roosevelt's advocacy of American membership in the Permanent Court of International Justice carries the suggestion of internationalism, as does Secretary Wallace's brochure *America Must Choose*. In the main, however, the New Deal may be said to be nationalistic, or "intranationalistic," both in its external and its domestic policy. Here we must distinguish between nationalism on the one hand, and chauvinism and imperialism on the other. It is nationalistic in the sense that it proclaims a belief in national supremacy as opposed to class and sectional cleavages; also in that it embraces a policy of "America first" in its monetary program and in its insistence upon a protective, though not prohibitive, tariff. But its nationalism is not to be confused with the bombastic pronouncements of some sections of the press which seem to assume that the United States, in its economic, military and naval policy, should disregard entirely the interests and feelings of other nations. It is a nationalism tempered by the policy of the "good neighbor." In this connection, it should be noted that the New Deal has been singularly and refreshingly free from demagogic appeals to sectional, national and racial prejudices, and from the use of such trite phrases as "our sacred institutions," "the principles which made the United States the greatest nation on the face of the earth," and "whether a nation so conceived and so dedicated can long endure,"¹⁷—phrases which seem to have become the principal stock-in-trade of a large section of the opposition.

One of the critics previously referred to says that the President's advisers are, for the most part, "a soft-thinking crew of romanticists."¹⁸ Romanticists they may be, but the President's

¹⁶Rexford G. Tugwell, "Government in a Changing World," *Review of Reviews*, 88:33.

¹⁷It is not meant to suggest that this last phrase was trite when it was first pronounced, but it becomes so when lifted out of its context, to be used in attacking current economic policies.

¹⁸Lawrence Dennis, article previously cited.

utterances often carry a flavor of stark realism. He repeatedly demands that we face the facts, as when he points to the shadow of peasantry hanging over six and a half million American farm families,¹⁹ and when he calls attention to the true nature of authority: "Authority is not confined to government. It applies to the whole field of industry, labor and finance. There are many more people in positions of authority in private life than in government service."²⁰ He recognizes that equality of opportunity no longer exists in any real sense, that the law of supply and demand cannot be left to the tender mercies of combinations and monopolies, and that the beneficence of industrialists, as a class, can no longer be trusted. He sees that the new dangers to our "liberties" come more from irresponsible economic power than they do from irresponsible political power.²¹ Perhaps the most unrealistic part of his program was that in which he apparently relied upon the voluntary co-operation of industry with the government under the National Recovery Administration. That, however, may have been just a tactful way of trying to command co-operation.

One of the charges frequently made in the early months of the present Administration was that the President's methods were "undemocratic," or that he aspired to overthrow our representative institutions and establish a dictatorship. There is little, if any, evidence to support these allegations. The President has repeatedly affirmed his faith in democracy, as opposed to dictatorship. The following quotation is typical of his pronouncements upon this subject: "In common counsel and common purposes we shall find the corrective of a present unhappy tendency to look for dictators. The wisdom of many men can save us from the errors of supposed supermen."²² Referring to the charge that his program is Fascistic, he has said "It is not Fascism because its inspiration springs from the mass of the people themselves rather than from a class or a group or a marching army. Moreover, it is being achieved without a change in fundamental republican method. We have kept the faith with, and in, our traditional political institutions."²³ Of course, his own declarations upon the subject are not conclusive. Indeed, they may be discounted as coming from

¹⁹Looking Forward, p. 127.

²⁰On Our Way, 248.

²¹Looking Forward, 28.

²²Ibid., 165.

²³On Our Way, Foreword.

an interested person, but we should note that he has not given encouragement to any of the movements in behalf of a dictatorship. Probably he could have become a dictator, temporarily at least, in March, 1933, had he wished, but he chose the path of constitutional rule instead. Whenever Congress has rebelled, as in overriding his veto of the Veterans' Compensation Act, in failing to pass the Tugwell Bill, and in the action of the Senate in rejecting the Protocol of Signature which would have made the United States a member of the Permanent Court of International Justice, he has accepted his defeat in good grace. When the Supreme Court has declared New Deal legislation to be unconstitutional, there has been no suggestion of defying the Court, or the use of force to achieve his ends. Furthermore, he has never shown himself intolerant of criticism or opposition, either in Congress or in the press. Few men with his power, and with dictatorial ambitions, would have laughed at the Wirt episode as he did, and it is difficult to imagine a Mussolini or a Hitler tolerating attacks of the sort that have been launched from time to time by Senators Schall and Long, the Hearst newspapers, and others. If a program be judged by its ends, or by its results, rather than by its methods or its expressions of lip service, the present Administration, with its concern for the plight of the "forgotten man," may be more democratic than any other in recent years.

While the New Deal does not repudiate democratic government, it has, undeniably, shifted the emphasis in government from the legislative to the executive branch. The powers of appointive administrative officials have been enhanced, actually if not legally, at the expense of the elected representatives of the people. This is not to ignore the fact that these powers were granted by Congress, and are subject to withdrawal. It is merely to recognize a *de facto* situation, which may or may not become permanent and *de jure*. There has been an unmistakeable trend in the direction of what its opponents call bureaucracy. This trend was apparent long before the advent of the New Deal, but its development has been appreciably accelerated during the last two and a half years. Bureaucracy, of course, need not be used as a term of opprobrium. It may be in accord with the best principles of administrative efficiency. Indeed, it is almost inevitable in a government that has changed from one primarily concerned with protecting rights to one having to do with the performance of services for its citizens—that is, one that has shifted from the negative to the positive rôle in society. Congress may fix the broad outlines of policy, but it

could not very well administer work relief projects, or supervise the lending of money to farmers and home owners.

Mr. Paul Blanshard has remarked that the Roosevelt program has nothing in common with Fascism except the assertion of governmental power over industry.²⁴ In the way of a positive program, perhaps this is true. In its larger aspects, however, there are other similarities. For a time, at least, it counteracted the centrifugal forces so noticeable in American society during the preceding decade, and provided a certain sense of unity of national purpose. In so doing, it performed a service similar to that of Fascism in Italy and Germany, but this was done without resort to squadrist or the mailed fist. It produced a greater spirit of cohesion without appealing to racial or national prejudice, to an exalted pride in military achievement, or to the glories of the past, In its denial of the "natural right" of business to go its own way without governmental interference—in its insistence that business is merely a part of social activity, and just as much subject to social control as any other activity—it suggests the totalitarian state. But, then, all philosophies of government, save anarchism, ultimately suggest the totalitarian state. The difference lies in how far it is believed the government, or the state, may *wisely* go in the exercise of its authority. The New Deal does not hold the state to be the sum total of all virtues, but it does hold that individual and class interests must give way to collective interests. Like the two familiar examples of Fascism, it receives its impulse largely from a single leader, but one who, apparently, does not aspire to be a dictator in any absolute sense.

The assertion that the New Deal is Communistic seems even more absurd than the charge of Fascism, if we understand by this term the complete abolition of private property and private initiative. It would hardly be worth considering were it not for the frequency with which it is heard. The President has repeatedly and unequivocally placed himself on record as favoring the protection of private property and the perpetuation of a system of private profits: "It is not that (Communism) either. It is not a driving regimentation founded upon the plans of a perpetuating directorate which subordinates the making of laws and the processes of the courts to the orders of the executive. Neither does it

²⁴"The Roosevelt Leadership," *Saturday Review of Literature*, 10:197.

manifest itself in the total elimination of any class, or in the abolition of private property (property?)²⁶ In this connection, it is revealing to note that the New Deal is under attack from another quarter as being too conservative, or as just another phase or species of capitalism—a somewhat chastened, purified and mitigated capitalism, perhaps, but capitalism, none the less. For this reason, there are many who feel that the truly enlightened conservative would do well to support it as a bulwark against more radical movements. According to this view, the greatest danger of Communism lies in the possibility that the New Deal may be defeated, either at the polls or in the courts, or by the active and passive resistance of industry. In that event, unless economic conditions are materially improved, a realignment of forces might take place, which would result in a movement either to the Communist left or the Fascist right.

The New Deal, we have said, is not Communism. Its leader admits that it may appear a bit revolutionary, but adds that "It is revolutionary, however, only in the sense that the measures adopted and the purposes that they seek differ from those that were used before. If it is a revolution, it is a peaceful one, achieved without violence, without overthrow of the purposes of established law and without the denial of just treatment to any individual or class."²⁶

Professor W. Y. Elliott has correctly observed that the modern economic structure cannot be adequately described in terms of any economic *ism*.²⁷ Nevertheless, the New Deal shows an unmistakable drift toward Collectivism, using the term to denote a mild form of Socialism. It is collectivistic in its avowed purpose, even if it has not yet reached that state in its execution. It does not anticipate collective ownership and operation on a large scale, but it does place its emphasis upon collective, rather than individual, welfare, and it recognizes a collective responsibility for alleviating want and destitution. As Secretary Ickes puts it, "We know now that if one considerable section of our population lacks sufficient food and clothing and proper shelter, our whole social structure is impaired and weakened,"²⁸ and "the government, in effect, is saying to business and industry: 'cooperate voluntarily if you can,

²⁶On Our Way, Foreword.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷The Need for the Constitutional Reform, (1935) p. 72

²⁸"The Social Implications of the Roosevelt Administration," Survey Graphic, 23:111.

but cooperate you must. You must restrain your selves for the common good. You must fit your proper place in the new social order. You must serve and no longer selfishly dominate."²⁹

If we use the "Rugged Individualism" of Mr. Hoover as our point of departure, the New Deal may be called a radical or "leftist movement, but it is by no means radical when compared with proletarian movements in Europe and elsewhere. It does not contemplate an arbitrary redistribution of wealth, but it does advocate a reversal of the present tendency toward further concentration: "Do what we may to inject health into our ailing economic order, we cannot make it endure for long unless we can bring about a wiser, more equitable distribution of national income."³⁰ It may be said to aim at what Mr. Walter Lippmann calls a "Compensated Economy," of which he says "Its method is to redress the balance of private actions by compensating public actions."³¹

If we run the gamut from Anarchism at one extreme, through Individualism, Collectivism and Socialism, to Communism, we have seen that Collectivism comes nearest to describing the New Deal. Again, if we pass from Conservatism, through Liberalism to Radicalism, perhaps Liberalism would be the best descriptive term. In both cases, the indicator rests on "dead center." To be sure, its Liberalism is not of the old *laissez faire* type. It repudiates the unrestrained competition of the nineteenth century liberals, which paradoxically enough, has been taken over bodily by the present-day conservatives and reactionaries. It may be called a New Liberalism—new in the sense that it discards many of the shibboleths of the Old Liberalism, which have become catchwords of the conservatives, and liberal in that it endeavors to make the ideals of the Old Liberalism effective by restraining the powerful economic groups that were and are impinging upon liberty—that is, by hindering the hindrances to freedom. Both the wisdom and the success of this aspect of the program may be questioned, but its underlying theory seems to be fairly clear.

Closely akin to the liberalism in the President's program are its ethical and humanitarian ideals. There can be little doubt that

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Looking Forward, p. 49.

³¹The Method of Freedom, p. 46. It should be noted that Mr. Lippmann excludes some of the measures of the New Deal from his Compensated Economy.

a strenuous effort is being made to inculcate higher standards of conduct in government, business, and society generally. Its ethical implications are evidenced by the drive against criminals and their abettors, the prosecution of manipulating financiers and income tax evaders, and its attempts to curb fraudulent stock sales and deceptive advertising, just as its humanitarian leanings are apparent in the abolition of child labor, the attempt to shorten hours of work and guarantee minimum wages, and the acceptance of governmental responsibility for the maintenance of at least a minimum standard of life.

While it is possible to identify the principal tenets of the New Deal, we cannot interpret it entirely in the jargon of political and social philosophers. To do so would be to play a game of make-believe. It was compounded of many elements. In the beginning, perhaps it represented less of a philosophy of government than a mere demand for action of some kind—a demand that grew out of impatience with the *fainéant* policy of the previous Administration. There had come to be a fairly general agreement that something was wrong, and that something ought to be done about it, though few people had any definite idea as to just *what* should be done. Out of this state of doubt and indecision, some kind of a positive program was bound to emerge. That the Roosevelt program was the one to emerge may be due quite as much to political accident as to anything else, but probably it is something more than political accident that this program represents a compromise between the extremes of radicalism and conservatism. Perhaps the best evidence that the New Deal does embrace a philosophy of the middle course, or the golden mean, is to be found in the fact that it is abhorrent alike to the confessed conservatives and the professed radicals.

AN ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN FOR THE COLONIZATION OF MEXICO

BY SIMON J. ELLISON

If the Southern Confederacy had triumphed in its struggle with the Federal Union, if it had succeeded in its set purpose to attain international position, it would have been easily capable of invading Mexico with an army of veterans under the command of such officers as Lee and Johnston. France would not have been able to remain in Mexico to fight the Confederate army. It would have retired, and under certain circumstances the opportunistic Napoleon, in an endeavor to assure himself of his limited gains, would have allied his forces with the South in order to divide the Mexican Republic. In either event Mexico, as a nation, would have disappeared.

Early in the American struggle the triumph of the Southern Confederacy was doubted by no one. Juarez keenly recognized the certainty of such invasion in case the South were successful, and this assurance colored all the relations which his government had with the Confederacy and with the United States.¹

The ultimate submission of the Southern Confederacy to the force of Union arms changed the aspect of the Mexican invasion in part. It was not to be an expansive movement of a new and vigorous nation; it developed into a deliberate effort on the part of fugitive Confederates—generals, governors, congressmen, cabinet officers—men who imagined that the whole power of the United States government was bent upon their capture, to seek asylum in the republic south of the Rio Grande under the protection of whatever governing group was in power.² Juarez, Maximilian, Bazaine—it made little difference at first to the fugitives; they were prepared to ally themselves with any one who was willing to employ their services.

¹Bulnes, Francisco. *El Verdadero Juárez y la Verdad Sobre la Intervencion y el Imperio*. Mexico, 1904, p. 144.

²Edwards, J. N. "Shelby's Expedition to Mexico," in the *Missouri Historical Review*, IV, (1920), p. 134; XVII, (1923), pp. 351-356; Letter of William M. Gwin, Jr. to his mother, dated at Mexico, May 16, 1865 and May 18, 1865, in House Executive Document No. 1, Part III, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 1865-66, p. 513; Letter of William M. Gwin to his wife, *ibid.*, pp. 513-514. See also Senate Executive Document No. 8, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 1865-66, pp. 18-19.

The first definite migration into Mexico was led by a Colonel Shelby, a Confederate cavalry officer.³ Heading a force of one thousand cavalymen Shelby moved southward from Austin, Texas. When the 'exiles' reached Coahuila they were graciously received by Biesca, governor of that state and commander-in-chief of Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and Nuevo Leon. Biesca offered Shelby military control of the three states, retaining to himself only the civil, requiring but one thing—a full, free and energetic support of Benito Juarez.⁴ Shelby was personally attracted by Biesca's offer. His adventurous character (he was willing to fight under anyone, anywhere) impelled him to submit to the preference of a large number of his men and officers for the Imperialist cause of Maximilian.

It was not long before Shelby proved an unbearable burden to Governor Biesca who, however, permitted the Confederates freedom of movement southward. On the Salinas River Shelby's force was ambushed by Mexican and Lipan Indian guerrillas. Near Lampazos Shelby's men were attacked with considerable losses once again. The Confederates quickly sought protection in Monterey which was at that time held by General Jeanningros with a garrison of five thousand French and Mexican soldiers.⁵

The suspicions of General Bazaine, French commander in Mexico, were soon aroused. He considered Shelby's advance as but the beginning of an irruption of Americans—Yankees, he called them—who intended to overrun Mexico and make war alike upon the French and upon Maximilian. He ordered the Confederates under Shelby to report to him in Mexico City immediately. The meeting of Maximilian, Bazaine, and Shelby was unceremonious.⁶ Shelby revealed his plans. He expressed his willingness to take immediate service in the Mexican Empire, to recruit a corps of forty thousand Americans, to supersede as far as possible the native troops in his army, to consolidate the government against the time of the withdrawal of the French soldiers, to encourage emigration from the South in every possible manner, to develop the resources of the country, and hold it with a strong and well-organized army until the people became reconciled to the changes desired by Maximilian and the French.

³Edwards, J. N. "Shelby's Expedition to Mexico," in the *Missouri Historical Review*, XIV-XVIII, (1920-1924).

⁴Edwards, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 252.

⁵Edwards, *op. cit.*, XV, pp. 545-546.

⁶Edwards, *op. cit.*, XVII, p. 192.

Maximilian did not reply directly to Shelby. He was unwilling to trust the Americans in an organization so large and so complete. Bazaine might have been in favor of the employment of the Americans. Maximilian was firm on diplomacy and undertook to try negotiation and correspondence with the United States.

In Monterey, at the time of Shelby's arrival on the invitation of General Jeanningros, was Dr. William M. Gwin, ex-United States senator and ex-governor of California. He had been to France and had just returned with letters patent from Napoleon III to administer the affairs of the Mexican province of Sonora as a duke. Gwin never actually took possession of his province though a colonizing settlement was effected. Maximilian peremptorily refused to instal him. At the mercy of Bazaine, and having no soldiers worthy of the name other than French soldiers, the Mexican emperor had weighty reasons besides private ones for such refusal. "It was not time for the coquetries of Empire before that Empire had an army, a bank account, and a clean bill of health." Gwin became indignant, Bazaine became amused, and Maximilian became disgusted. In the end Gwin left the country.

Gwin's plan was grandiose. He proposed to take to the frontier of Mexico all the discontented citizens of the United States living in the South, with the design of organizing them under the protection and with the assistance of France. A letter to his wife and daughters in Paris reveals the reason for his efforts to establish himself and his 'countrymen' in Mexico.

The startling news from the United States [probably President Johnson's position with regard to treason] has made the blood of every Southern sympathizer run cold with horror. No one will be safe in our native country. How I thank Providence that I have a home for my wife and children, where they will be safe from oppression, and where we have every prospect of immediate and permanent prosperity. My policy is on every man's lips as the only one that will save this empire.⁷

His later letters are enthusiastic. His hope and spirits were unbounded. "The stern reality that confronts every one of my sentiments banishes all romance. I must have realities. The crusades will be surpassed in the emigration to the country of my

⁷H. Ex. Doc., No. 1, Part III, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 1865-66, pp. 513-514; Sen. Ex. Doc., No. 8, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 1865-66, p. 19.

future home, and such a people never moved from one country to another. . . . When I write you to come, bring as many millions as you please, and they will soon turn into tens of millions. Even the most skeptical here now acknowledge that no such country exists on the earth unoccupied . . ."⁸

Southerners entered Mexico in large numbers upon the enthusiastic invitation of Gwin. Maximilian's approval was not as yet forthcoming, but Gwin took it for granted. Maximilian was cautious, for he perceived the vast implications involved. He could not endanger himself and his followers by inviting a certain conflict with the recently successful Federal 'Yankees.' Puppet that he was, he revealed in no uncertain terms his reluctance to compromise himself any more than he had already done. He desired to remain emperor but not at the cost of the subjection of Mexico to completely foreign forces. The French emperor caught at the straw which Gwin and Shelby and other Confederates so willingly offered him. He recognized full well the selfishness of their purpose but he overlooked that in his effort to better ensconce himself and his Hapsburg prince in Mexico. Bazaine received orders from Napoleon to encourage the Confederates to offer their services against Juarez and his American governmental support.⁹

But everything was dependent upon Maximilian. He retained that much freedom of action. Both Bazaine and Almonte, Mexican imperialist, encouraged Gwin to expect certain success.¹⁰ The Bazaine-Almonte faction promised an overturn in the Maximilian government so that those opposing the Gwin project would be displaced by the Almonte group. Almonte had from the first declared that Gwin's plan of colonization was "the only salvation of the empire."¹¹ In a letter, under date of May 18, 1865, to his friend in New York, Gwin wrote with unabated enthusiasm of Almonte's personal encouragement.

⁸William M. Gwin, Sr. to Col. John Winthrop, Mexico City, May 18, 1865, in H. Ex. Doc., No. 1, Part III, 39 Congress, 1 Session, 1865-66, p. 514; also in Sen. Ex. Doc., *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

⁹Col. Enrique A. Mejia to Don Matias Romero, July 1, 1865, in H. Ex. Doc., No. 1, Part III, as cited, p. 512. See also Sen. Ex. Doc., No. 8, as cited, p. 18.

¹⁰William M. Gwin, Jr. to his mother, May 18, 1865, in H. Ex. Doc., No. 1, Part III, as cited, p. 513; William M. Gwin, Sr. to Col. Winthrop, as cited above, p. 514.

¹¹William M. Gwin, Sr. to Col. Winthrop, as cited above, p. 514.

The same sentiment is uttered by every one in favor of the empire. In fact, if anything in the future can be certain in this country, at an early day you will see a decree opening North Mexico to the enterprise of the world. What a people we can assemble there if this policy is adopted. What a country it will be in a very few years . . .¹²

The following month there appeared in the *New York World* under the lead "Emigration to Mexico" an item stating that the minister of public works in Mexico advised that Dr. Thomas C. Massey, an American citizen and co-worker of Dr. Gwin, had been allowed to establish agencies for emigration to Mexico *as a private enterprise solely*, with no responsibility incurred by the government of the Emperor Maximilian.¹³

Maximilian's self-assertion was not quite pronounced. He withheld the positive approval of the Napoleon-encouraged project, but he dared not voice disapproval. His silence was taken in many quarters to mean tacit consent. Correspondence from Vera Cruz published in the *New Orleans Times* at that time reported that "the Confederates still continue to flock to Mexico." "There is no doubt," one writer observed, "Dr. Gwin will get his project through. It only awaits the signature of Maximilian to become a law."¹⁴

The information was current that Gwin was to be appointed director-general of emigration for the states of Sonora, Chihuahua, Durango, and Tamaulipas, with extraordinary powers and eight thousand French troops to back him.¹⁵ The *New Orleans Times*, a pro-Union newspaper, in its issue of June 1, 1865, pointed out that the emigration was to be "strictly southern or confederate." A considerable number of Confederates were to be armed and paid by the Empire but kept in the four states above-mentioned as a protection to the emigrants. Strategic points were to be fortified and garrisoned on the frontier.¹⁶

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³*New York World*, issue of June 19, 1865. See H. Ex. Doc., No. 1, Part III, as cited, p. 516; also Sen. Ex. Doc., No. 8, as cited, p. 22.

¹⁴*New Orleans Times*, issue of June 1, 1865. See H. Ex. Doc., No. 1, Part III, as cited, Enclosure 8, p. 517; also Sen. Ex. Doc., No. 8, as cited, pp. 22-23.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶*Ibid.*

The Anglo-Americans crossed the Rio Grande in large numbers providing with little delay a mobile groundwork for the Gwin enterprise. Southerners high in station in American and Confederate affairs,¹⁷ who upon the news from Appomattox Court House irreconcilably accepted a life of exile to submission and possible trial for treason, entered the northern states of Mexico. An unusually large proportion came from the border state of Missouri¹⁸ to escape the punishment which awaited them there upon the termination of hostilities at the hands of the pro-Union Missourians.

The Southerners in Mexico were elated and golden visions continued to float before them. They considered a "Yankee invasion" of Mexico as certain, but they held fast to the hope that France, Austria, and Belgium would not allow the United States to invade the empire. "The confederates seriously proclaim," a Vera Cruz correspondent in the *New Orleans Times* observed, "that they only can save the empire by the emigration of southerners who will rally by thousands at the call of Gwin, and raise an impassable bulwark against American aggression. This is seriously believed and circulated by the French commander-in-chief."¹⁹

According to Don Matias Romero, Mexican minister at Washington, Maximilian had at one time thrown aside all "dissimulation," made public his "real plans," and appointed as agents of colonization General Sterling Price, of Missouri, Isham Harris, former governor of Tennessee, Judge John Perkins, of Louisiana, and William F. Hardeman and O. M. Roberts, of Texas. Price, Harris, and Perkins were assigned to the duties connected with the examination and report on lands offered for colonization purposes on the Gulf; Hardeman and Roberts had the same duty on the Pacific.²⁰ The director of the emigration, Romero pointed out, was M. F. Maury, ex-lieutenant of the United States Navy and afterwards agent in Europe for the Confederate States. For

¹⁷H. Ex. Doc., No. , Part III, as cited, pp. 522-523; also Sen Ex. Doc., No. 8, as cited, pp. 32-34.

¹⁸H. Ex. Doc., No. 1, Part III, loc. cit.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 517.

²⁰Romero to Secretary of State William H. Seward, October 20, 1865, in H. Ex. Doc., No. 1, Part III as cited, pp. 522-523; also in Sen Ex. Doc., No. 8, as cited, pp. 31-32. See also enclosure No. 1 in H. Ex. Doc., No. 1, Part III, as cited, from *Mexico Times*, September 23, 1865 under the hand, "Colonization of Public Lands."

this purpose Maury was declared a subject of Maximilian, and granted the right to hold the offices reserved to the natural-born in Mexico. On September 27, 1865, Maury was appointed by Maximilian "honorary councillor of state and imperial commissioner of colonization."²¹ General J. B. Magruder, "a declared enemy" of the United States, as Romero puts it, was assigned as chief of the colonization land-office on the same day. Maury was authorized to establish agencies in the states of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Missouri, and California, and in the cities of Mobile and New Orleans, which plainly shows, as Romero declared, that "they only think to get men from the South, and precisely from those States where they suppose there are most malcontents against this government." "It is a very significant fact," Romero observed in the conclusion of his communication to Secretary of State William Seward under date of November 4, 1865, "that not one single agency is established in the northern states which were faithful to the Union of this government during the last civil war." On December 12, 1865 Romero transmitted to Seward a copy of a letter written in English, from Cordova, Mexico, under date of November 12, 1865, by Mr. Isham G. Harris, ex-governor of Tennessee, general in the Confederate army, and a prominent person among the insurgents.²² This letter was directed to a Mr. George W. Adair, of Atlanta, Georgia, and was published in the *New Era* of that city. It contained the details and information confirming what Romero had mentioned in his notes respecting the Confederate colonization in Mexico. Harris described in unrestrained fashion the country between Mexico City and Vera Cruz which was selected for the colonization scheme. It was the "most beautiful, the best agricultural country" that he ever saw, possessing a "delightful climate, always temperate, always pleasant." The soil was "rich and productive, yielding large crops of corn, barely, rice, tobacco, sugar-cane, coffee, and tropical fruits." "Ten miles from here (Cordova), in the direction of the coast," he observed, "you strike as good a cotton country as can be found in the world."²³

The attempt of Harris to sell the idea of the emigration to Mexico is illuminating.

²¹Romero to Seward, New York City, November 4, 1865, *ibid.*, pp. 526-527.

²²Romero to Seward, December 12, 1865, *ibid.*, p. 528.

²³Isham G. Harris to George W. Adair, Cordova, Mexico, November 12, 1865. Copy in H. Ex. Doc., No. 1, Part III, as cited earlier, pp. 528-530.

Will many of the people of the Southern States feel inclined to seek new homes; or will they follow the example of Lee, Johnston, and others? Mexico presents the finest field that I have ever seen for the enterprise of our people; and now that slavery is abolished in the South, hired labor can be much more easily procured here and made much more profitable than in any part of the United States. I do not propose, however, to urge or even advise any one to come; I only propose to give them facts, and leave them to decide for themselves, as I have done for myself. Such as feel inclined to come will be received with open arms and cordial welcome . . .

Three hundred and fifty thousand acres of land were set apart for the Anglo-Americans in the states of Vera Cruz and Puebla.²⁴ In the vicinity of Cordova there was a large extent of uncultivated land which had once belonged to the Church, and which had been confiscated by Juarez. When Maximilian came into possession of the government, it was confidently believed that he would restore to the Church its revenues and territory, and more especially that portion of the ecclesiastical domain so eminently valuable as that about Cordova. It embraced between three hundred and fifty to five hundred thousand acres of cotton and sugar and coffee land, well-watered, and lying directly upon the great national road from Vera Cruz to the capital, and upon the Mexican Imperial Railroad, then finished to Paso del Macho, twenty-five miles southward from Cordova. Maximilian, however, confirmed the decree of confiscation issued by Juarez, and set all this land apart for the benefit of American emigrants who, as actual settlers, desired to locate upon it and begin at once the work of cultivation. Men with families were to receive 640 acres at \$1.25 per acre, and men without families 320 acres at the same price. Maury adopted the American plan of division, and thereby secured the establishment of a system that was as familiar to the newcomers as it was satisfactory.²⁵

²⁴Romero to William Hunter, Acting Secretary of State, December 31, 1865, with enclosures, in H. Ex. Doc., No. 1, Part III, as cited, pp. 530-531. According to Edwards, in his article on Shelby's Expedition, 500,000 acres of land were set apart for the benefit of American emigrants. See Edwards, *op. cit.*, XVII, p. 353.

²⁵Edwards, *op. cit.*, XVII, p. 353.

Under date of December 7, 1865, *La Sociedad*, a Mexico City publication, bore the invitation of Maximilian through Maury for immigration "from all quarters, and without distinction as to nationality." Maury's superlative and almost rhapsodizing description of the country far outdoes the comparatively modest effort of Harris.

The earth here yields to the care of husbandry with a profusion that would seem incredible there (in the South) and fabulous in Europe. In some places it crowns the labor of the husbandman regularly with two and in others with three harvests annually; and in each one he gathers one hundred, two hundred, sometimes three hundred, and occasionally four hundred fold, and even more, according to his own skill and the kind of seed used.

Cotton and corn do well in almost all parts of the empire. But the cotton, especially of Tamaulipas, Matamoras, Fresnillo, Durango, Mazatlan, and the states north, is said to be of a better staple, save Sea-island, than any produced in the United States; indeed, the cotton of Yucatan is called Sea-Island.

Under these fine climates which give purity and transparency to the atmosphere that makes existence itself an enjoyment, and invest the eye with the faculties of almost a new sense, the vegetable kingdom displays its wealth and its powers most gorgeously, and with the most marvelous vigor and concentration.

Here, besides cotton and corn, the olive and the vine, we have the *finest* of wheat, with pulse and all the cereals in *great perfection*; also tobacco, coffee, sugar-cane, the cocoa plant, rice, indigo, a cochineal, pimento, India-rubber, and henuquin, a peculiar and valuable fibre that answers many of the purposes of both flax and hemp, and, last of all, and what moreover, no other country in the world can produce—Flora's feat and Bacchus's boast—the lordly maguey, or pulque plant of Anahuac...

The mountains abound with minerals, the woods with game, and the forests with the finest of timber—with the most exquisite dye and ornamental woods, gums and spices, drugs, and medicinal plants of rare virtues.

The Mississippi valley, even in its palmiest days, could not boast any plantation that could compare in baronial splendor, lordly magnificence and princely hospitality with your Mexican hacienda that has escaped the ravages of war . . .²⁶

By one mail from New York Maury received over seven hundred letters asking for circulars descriptive of the country and of the way to reach it!²⁷

Many settlers arrived in the Anglo-American colony—named Carlota. A village sprang up over night. Emigration from the United States was active both from Texas overland and by water from the Gulf.²⁸ General Sterling Price, of Missouri, with a remnant of his body-guard and a few personal friends, built himself a bamboo house in the town of Carlota, and commenced in earnest the life of a farmer. General Slaughter and Captain Price established a large saw-mill at Orizaba. General Bee engaged extensively in the raising of cotton, as, also, did Captains Cundiff and Hodge. General Hindman, having mastered the Spanish language in the short space of three months, began the practice of law in Cordova. General Stevens, the chief engineer of General Robert E. Lee's staff, was made chief engineer of the Mexican Imperial Railroad. Governor Reynolds was appointed superintendent of two shortline railroads running out from the city. General Shelby and Major McMurty, with headquarters at Cordova, became large freight contractors, and established a line of wagons from Paso del Macho to the capital. Ex-Governor Allen, of Louisiana, assisted by the emperor, founded the *Mexican Times*, a paper printed in English, and devoted to the interests of colonization. Generals Lyon, of Kentucky, and McCausland, of Virginia, were appointed government surveyors. General Watkins was taken into the diplomatic service and sent to Washington on a special mission. Everywhere the Americans were honored and promoted, but the army, to any considerable number of them, was as a sealed book. "Where they could have done the most good they were forbidden to enter."²⁹

During the continued conflict between the Juarists and the Imperialists the town of Carlota was destroyed. In a night the

²⁶H. Ex. Doc., No. 1, Part III, as cited, pp. 531-533, enclosure No. 2.

²⁷Edwards, *op. cit.*, XVII, p. 351.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 355.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 356.

labor and toil of a long year were utterly broken up and destroyed. A band of 'freebooters,' one writer calls them, came out of the mountains and inflicted a disastrous blow upon the life of the colony.³⁰ Farming implements were destroyed, the stock was slaughtered in the fields, the cabins were burned, and the growing crops beaten down under the feet of the horses.

The grandiose enterprise so enthusiastically begun now succumbed before the combined attacks of the Juarist forces and the diplomatic remonstrances of the United States Department of State. Don Matias Homero worked hard to frustrate the plan which in its inception was hostile to Mexico, and which the Emperor of the French was endeavoring to develop in that republic. He carried on a tireless correspondence with Secretary of State William Seward, providing the latter with complete information and with intercepted communications carried on by the principals in the enterprise. Seward acted with efficacy to undermine the colonization scheme which, undertaken by Confederate emigrants to promote Maximilian's success, was wholly inimical to the policy of the United States. The United States minister to Paris, John Bigelow, was directed to get an assurance that "all the pretences of Dr. Gwin and his associates were destitute of any sanction from the Emperor of the French" because "the French Government need not be informed of the susceptibilities of the people of the United States in regard to Mexico."³¹ Bigelow exerted the proper diplomatic pressure and the United States appeared face to face with the French dream.³² The Gwin plan collapsed miserably. Napoleon III, in the face of American opposition and the foreboding turn of events in Europe, sought a means of dropping the original project. Early in 1867 the French forces invading Mexico were withdrawn, leaving the hapless Maximilian to the Juarists.

³⁰Edwards, *op. cit.*, XVIII, pp. 450-451.

³¹Seward to John Bigelow, July 13, 1865, in H. Ex. Doc., No. 1, Part III, as cited, pp. 518-519.

³²Bigelow to Seward, August 10, 1865, *ibid.*, pp. 519-521; Drouyn de Lhuys to Bigelow, August 7, 1865, *ibid.*, pp. 520-521. A copy of Bigelow's letter to the French Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, can be found in Arrangoiz, D. F. de Paula, *Méjico desde 1808 hasta 1867*, Tomo 3, pp. 330-333.

OUR NEW LINE OF FEDERALISM

BY STUART A. MACCORKLE

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Federalism has long been in the air; it is now on the carpet again. Present conditions have introduced new theories and practices in government. The old idea that there were certain functions of government beyond which it was not desirable for the mechanism of the state to go, has come to be replaced by one which regards government as an agency to take positive action whenever it can effectively do so to the best interest of the people.¹ Our early period of constitutional development witnessed relatively few matters which were not handled by the individual states, acting independently. Today various economic changes, improved means of communication, and the like, have steadily tended to make matters which formerly were of local concern ones which can be best handled only by the central government. The question today naturally arises: Does the Federal System of government still remain?

David Lawrence recently expressed his view of the New Deal as follows: "If the New Deal of the Rooseveltian democracy is made permanent, it means the end of the dual system of sovereignty. It means the abolition of state autonomy and ultimately city autonomy. A strong centralized authority is a Hamiltonian, not a Jeffersonian concept of government."²

Jefferson's espousal of states' rights, it will be well recalled, was only a weapon by which he hoped to preserve individual rights—the most efficient weapon at hand. He was primarily interested in personal prerogatives, not the prerogatives of the state or the mechanics of government. The latter were secondary rather than primary with him. To me, then the New Deal hardly seems a complete reversal of the Jeffersonian theory of government. Quoting Professor Robert K. Gooch of the University of Virginia: "If Jefferson were on earth today, far from being an eighteenth century man in the twentieth, he would be in the forefront of every struggle which to his great vision might appear

¹See the *American Political Science Review*, vol. xxvii, no. 1, W. F. Willoughby, "A Program for Research in Political Science."

²The *United States News*, Feb. 19, 1934.

calculated to make life better for that mass of people in which he had such a passionate interest and such strong confidence."³

The disadvantages inherent in the Federal System of government have been brought to light and accentuated by numerous students of Political Science. Countries which have in recent years adopted new constitutional systems have, after a careful study of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the federal and unitary types of government, decided in favor of the latter. Even within the United States there are those who believe that, regardless of its merits or demerits, the Federal System is rapidly passing from us.

Professor A. V. Dicey, writing during the later part of the nineteenth century, stated that the United States was then one of the best examples of federalism.⁴ Regardless of the authenticity of this assertion, we are forced to acknowledge our great indebtedness to the system, for it is extremely doubtful if the American people could ever have been united under any form of government that was not dualistic in nature.⁵ It is obvious to everyone today, that no scheme could have produced a national unity if the states had not been willing to surrender to a degree their separate independence. The constitution, which was a culmination of numerous compromises between the large and small states, is now one of the oldest in existence—it probably has undergone fewer changes than the constitutions of most civilized countries. On the other hand, it has not stood still—the spirit which animates it today is different from what it was in the beginning. We have renounced the old theory of state sovereignty without an alteration in text of the instrument, but more important than a change in text of the law is the change in public sentiment.

Since March 4, 1933, many permanent and emergency agencies of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government have been created.⁶ None of these has any more constitutional right to interfere with matters of state competence than it would have had a hundred years ago, but the general support of the nation has enabled them to engage in activities which would have been beyond the dreams of Federalist leaders in the

³The *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, June, 1935, Robert K. Gooch, "Reconciling Jeffersonian Principles with the New Deal."

⁴A. V. Dicey, *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution*, (5th ed.) p. 131.

⁵Herbert A. Smith, *Federalism in North America*, p. 5.

⁶For details, see *The United States News*, Mar. 12, 1934.

latter years of the eighteenth century. Nor is it likely that the emergency which led to their existence will soon pass, for if they are successful, not only will their duration be extended, but also their application to the economic life of the nation will doubtless tend to be intensified rather than diminished.⁷ Their creation has meant a great growth in the administrative machinery of our government.

Administrative law is found to be emphasized in most European countries today. It seems to have developed logically from the Roman Civil Law, is not founded upon custom, it does not rise from among the members of the community, but consists essentially of rules of action imposed from above by law-givers. The English Common Law is the core of our American systems of law. However, recent years particularly have brought into existence in the United States a system of law which bears the mark of "administrative law." It has obtained a foothold in recent years largely through the increasing numbers of boards, bureaus, and commissions. These, Congress has created, delegating to them the authority to make rules and regulations having the force of law and permitting them to sit in judgement over and to enforce the law they create.

Time likewise has somewhat altered the position of the state within our union. During the early period of our existence and perhaps until the Civil War the states were of major importance. Afterward, for a period at least, they were pushed into the background. With the coming of the twentieth century, they again loom up in importance, but serve in a far different capacity. During the earlier period of our constitutional development, emphasis was placed upon the legislative branch of government. The states were regarded in the light of local legislative units; therefore, quite naturally during this period the line of federalism was drawn upon a legislative basis. We had then "legislative federalism." Today, with the shift in the direction of administration the states are to be regarded in a new role; namely, as administrative units. The line of demarcation between central and local government tends more and more to become one drawn upon an administrative basis. The central government is acting more frequently upon the administrative authority of the state.⁸

⁷The Nation, October 18, 1933, Maurice Finkelstein, "The Dilemma of the Supreme Court."

⁸See Herman Finer, *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, vol. I, pp. 276-283.

Such a result is only natural, for economic changes generally precede political alterations. Until almost the close of the last century America might have been termed an "agricultural society." The problems which arose then were of such a nature that they could be met and disposed of successfully by individual states. But today this is no longer true. We are rapidly becoming an industrialized nation, and with industrialization problems have appeared with which the local units of government are no longer capable of coping. Centralization in government has been forced upon us. Legislation is rapidly becoming mainly national, but the administration in many instances is being confided to the constituent states. Heretofore, legislation was largely localized, and administration centralized.

The Central Government today often permits, or on some occasions may even request, a state official to perform a Federal service; however, such state official cannot be compelled to act.⁹ The moral obligation may be great upon the individual state to perform administrative commands from the Federal Government; it may be expedient that it do so, but still there exists no legal means by an issue of a mandamus or otherwise to compel such action.

James Bryce in commenting upon the relationship between central and state government in America wrote: "The National Government touches the States as corporate commonwealths in three points. One is their function in helping to form the National Government; another is the control exercised over them by the Federal Constitution through the Federal Courts; the third is the control exercised over them by the Federal Legislature and Executive in the discharge of the governing functions which these latter authorities possess."¹⁰ It is the last of these that we are hearing so much about today.

Federal aid for the individual states has increased by leaps and bounds. The growth of the subsidy system has been almost phenomenal. The past three years have witnessed millions of dollars being poured by the National Government into the states for the construction of highways, the rehabilitation of agriculture,

⁹W. W. Willoughby, *The American Constitutional System*, p. 123.

¹⁰James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, (2nd ed. revised) I, 319.

the refinancing of industries and homes, the promotion of vocational education and like services. Most of this money now appropriated by Congress for state use must be spent in a manner approved by Federal administrative authorities.¹¹ As a result it is evident that central and state governments must learn the art of cooperating with each other. Some state legislatures did enact legislation giving legislative force to the NRA agreements as they apply particularly to intrastate industry and business. The West Virginia Act, for instance, which was spoken of as the "model" NRA act was drawn up by the NRA in Washington as a plan of state cooperation with the federal program. Many other states took similar steps in an effort to cooperate with the administration in Washington.

The Roosevelt administration especially has attempted to foster Federal-state cooperation. The President more than once has stated, "It is a primary purpose of my administration to cooperate with the states..." And the 74th Congress which has just adjourned—the session in which insiders claim that Mr. Roosevelt got about 95 per cent of his legislative recommendations written into law carried further the idea of Federal-state cooperation when it passed such acts as the Social Security Bill and rewrote the Agricultural Adjustment Act.¹²

As cooperation between central and state government has become expedient, centralization has increased. The Civil War, the Spanish American War, the World War and the depression of 1929 have prepared the way for the ever growing power of Congress, until today the Federal Government has laws embracing agriculture, education, health, child welfare, vocational training, employment, food, drugs, narcotics, automobile thefts, dairying, agricultural marketing, industrial marketing, mining, regulation of duck-shooting, farm relief and loans, flood relief, farm mortgage relief, home mortgage relief, drought relief, and many other affairs formerly controlled exclusively by the states. And what in this respect could not be accomplished by act of Congress has in some cases been achieved by treaty.¹³

¹¹Austin F. MacDonald, *Federal Aid*, p. 2.

¹²At all times the relationship between Washington and the state capitols is not so harmonious. Often anything but affection exists between the two—as has been true from time to time when much friction was evidenced between the Roosevelt administration and the States of Georgia, Illinois, Illinois, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania over the question of Federal relief.

¹³*Missouri v. Holland*, 252 U. S. 416.

Hitherto, opinion in this country has been strongly set against the development of what might be termed Federal centralization.¹⁴ Many regard with dismay the rapid expansion of government functions, and the increase in bureaucracy which seems almost inevitably to follow. They feel that we are being over-governed and that our time-honored liberties are being disregarded. They believe it is time to call a halt and to refuse to allow the government to assume any more power.

The reason for this centralization is that our civilization has increased in complexity. The freedom and liberty of the individual is dependent upon a smooth-working government system as a whole, and if common regulation is to prevail legislative centralization inevitably must follow. Of necessity our old orthodox legislative federalism must give way to a new form which is more in keeping with the need of a modern age.

A rapid glance at our past will bring to mind that the tenth amendment to our constitution drew the line of federalism, the eighteenth, once a part of the instrument, definitely gave police power to the National Government, and the pending child labor amendment now before the states for ratification carries on the principles once embodied in the prohibition amendment. But federalism, according to our constitution does not of necessity have to be legislative in nature—it may be administrative.

Now turning to definitions. According to Edward A. Freeman, "A Federal commonwealth, then, in its perfect form, is one which forms a single state in its relations to other nations, but which consists of many states with regard to its internal governments."¹⁵ From this definition it seems evident that the Federal System of government requires the existence of constitutional limits of authority. between central and state government.¹⁶ But does this mean that the line separating the two agencies of government must be drawn on a legislative basis? Not necessarily so. Neither does it matter what form of government the state assumes in order that the Federal System exist. It may be democratic, aristocratic, or even monarchic in nature.¹⁷

¹⁴See C. Perry Patterson, *American Government*, (revised edition) pp. 520-537.

¹⁵Edward A. Freeman, *History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy*, p. 7.

¹⁶John Stuart Mill, *Representative Government*, Ch. XVII.

¹⁷Freeman, *op. cit.* p. 82.

Under our Federal System that which concerns the nation as a whole is placed or should be placed under the control of the National Government. All matters which are not primarily of common interest should remain in the hands of the individual states. To quote Dicey: "The distribution of power is an essential feature of federalism. The object for which a federal state is formed involves a division of authority between the National Government and the separate states."¹⁸

Granting that federalism means legalism, that it means the predominance of the judiciary in the constitution—the prevalence of a spirit of legality among the people,¹⁹ cannot administrative action be passed upon by the courts as well as legislative action? Even going so far as to accept Sir John Marriot's characteristics of federalism which are as follows: the dualism of laws, reduplication of political organs, (namely, legislative, executive, and judicial), precise definition of powers in a written and preferably rigid constitution, the separation of powers, a supreme court of justice competent to act as an interpreter of the constitution and as arbiter between conflicting laws, and lastly a bicameral legislature including a federal second chamber;²⁰ granting that these are the true characteristics of federalism, "administrative federalism" still seems possible.

The criticisms offered by De Tocqueville around the middle of the nineteenth century that the federal system is too complex in nature, that the central government under such a system is inherently weak, that it is deficient in every phase of centralized administration no longer appear as true as when they were first offered.²¹ The federal principle is consistent with almost every form of government. Switzerland has shown that federalism does not quarrel with direct democracy, Germany proved it to be not inconsistent with an empire resting upon the supremacy of one among several nominally co-equal states, and Canada has worked out her federal salvation under the form of a constitutional monarchy.

The acts of the New Deal cannot be regarded as self-explanatory. They must be interpreted in terms of something broader

¹⁸Dicey, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 166.

²⁰*The Nineteenth Century*, June, 1918, J. A. R. Marriott, "The Problem of Federalism."

²¹De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, pp. 165-170.

and deeper than the acts themselves. They provide for a greater flexibility than we have known before. President Roosevelt in his message to Congress on January 3, 1934, stated that the New Deal had come to stay. If this be true, an increased emphasis in administration must and will result—"national planning on a broad scale lies ahead." The question might well be asked, how far ahead? For when one reads the Schechter decision one finds that here the court has redefined the boundaries that separate the function of the state from those of the nation. The opinion of the court simply reaffirms an old principle—legislative federalism.

Our Federal System no doubt will continue to prevail, but let it be a federalism which will break the orthodox mold and emerge in a form better geared to meet the demands and needs of the twentieth century.

ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND SECURITY

BY KARL E. ASHBURN
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I propose to discuss economic nationalism and security, and since the subject is so extensive, I find it essential to confine my remarks largely to the effects of the economic policies of the United States upon world trade and foreign commercial policies.

Economic nationalism, according to the recent report of the Hutchins Commission, means a policy directed toward as much self-sufficiency as is feasible in the modern world.¹ Economic internationalism, the Hutchins Commission goes on to say, means, on the contrary, intercourse between nations on a basis as free as possible from artificial barriers. Economic internationalism is a phase of the general doctrine of economic liberalism which grew to be a controlling principle among western nations during the nineteenth century. The post-war growth of economic nationalism has resulted from economic expediency and from the fears and rivalries which nations have toward each other.²

The conflict between economic nationalism and economic internationalism exists primarily in the field of international trade in commodities. The steady development of transportation tends to produce a single world economy, nations becoming increasingly interdependent. This economic tendency has no respect for national boundaries, and, if unimpeded, might eventually bring about the complete interdependence of all parts of the world. Blocking the path of economic internationalism, however, lies the spirit of nationalism, which tends to promote the ideal of national self-sufficiency. The effect of barriers to the free movement of goods between nations—exemplified chiefly by protective tariff systems and quotas—is to promote diversification rather than specialization in the industries of a nation. Tariff barriers cause nations to produce goods which they might otherwise import more cheaply.³

(This paper was read before the Economics Section.)

¹Report of the Hutchins Commission of Inquiry into National Policy in International Economic Relations, p. 11.

²(Columbia University Associates), *Contemporary Problems in the United States*, 1933-1934 Edition, Vol. 1, p. 240.

³*Ibid.*, p. 240.

Economic nationalism is being adopted today in response to a deep-seated feeling of insecurity. The fears of nations for their security are partly economic, partly political. The international feeling of insecurity is significant for America because one of its expressions is the attempt of nations to produce at home all the required foodstuffs. It is one of the principal reasons why American agriculture has lost many of its export markets. The Hutchins Commission is of the opinion that the liberalizing of trade and intercourse between nations would ease the current political friction, and, conversely, the reduction of political friction would smooth the path for economic intercourse.⁴ Certainly the struggle for markets and the worry over sources of raw materials is responsible for much of the feeling of insecurity that finds expression in the race for armaments.⁵

Throughout the entire world protected industries have been piling up surpluses, and demanding further protection and export outlets in the same breath.⁶ Tariff walls have risen higher and higher; quotas and embargoes have been resorted to; national monetary units depreciated for the purpose of stimulating export trade; and complaints multiply. Nations are demanding more outbound traffic, but feel they cannot accept more inbound traffic.⁷ The lack of a stable international monetary system is one of the chief obstacles to world economic recovery. There can be no doubt that the establishment of a stable international monetary system and unhampered exchange of commodities are necessary conditions for the recovery of world trade and the creation of a feeling of international political security.

The United States can contribute greatly to the improvement of world trade by removing as rapidly as possible the barriers to international trade that it has erected, and by inducing other nations to remove their barriers. According to Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace, a practical readjustment of our tariff policy would involve the careful examination of every product produced in the United States or imported, and the determination of just which of our monopolistic or inefficient industries we are willing to expose to substantial foreign competition. This problem should be approached from the point of view of a long-time national plan

⁴See Hutchins Commission Report, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁶See *The American Observer*, March 18, 1935, p. 3.

⁷See Henry A. Wallace, *America Must Choose*, p. 28.

which we are willing to follow for at least two or three decades even if certain of our industries and interests are injured and complain bitterly.⁸

According to Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, the United States is in the best position to assume a world leadership in the adoption of more intelligent international commercial policies. Certainly it is urgent in the interest of world economic recovery for us to exert a determined leadership in the direction of liberal commercial policies in order to restore the equality of treatment upon which foreign commerce alone can thrive. The State Department through the trade agreements program is now seeking to persuade other countries to join us in breaking down excessive barriers to trade so that its movements may be less hampered and its volume increased. Agreements already concluded with Cuba, Brazil, and Belgium, and others which are in prospect, indicate that certain nations will cooperate. The agreement with Cuba has resulted in a stimulation of trade, and it is hoped that other agreements will have like consequences.⁹

Despite the advantages to be gained from a policy of economic internationalism many American people favor a policy of economic nationalism and a high protective tariff. Those who favor a high protective tariff contend that such tariffs protect American workers against the pauper labor of Europe and Asia, and the American people generally from a low standard of living. The facts, however, do not bear out this contention. According to Secretary Hull, a study made of thirty-six typical industries which are not aided by the tariff and thirty-six industries which are highly protected shows that in 1929 the average remuneration of wage-earners in the highly protected industries was \$595 less than that of the workers in the industries which received no tariff benefits. The average annual income in the unprotected industries was \$1,704, while that in the highly protected industries was \$1,109.¹⁰

Secretary Hull in a recent radio address shows that those who contend that a virtually prohibitive tariff is absolutely essential to the United States either ignore or overlook certain fundamental facts. According to the Census of 1930, there were about fifty million gainful employed workers in the United States. More

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

⁹Cordell Hull, *World Trade and American Recovery*, Radio Discussion No. 1., March 23, 1935, pp. 2-4.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 5.

than half this number, employed in service industries, transportation, wholesale and retail business, public utilities, and building trades, are not only not helped by the tariff, but as consumers, are actually injured by the excessive prices of consumption goods artificially maintained by our high protective tariff. Ten million farmers, a large part of whose products are exported and sold at world market prices, are obliged to buy in a protected market. Of the remainder, a larger proportion are engaged in industries that are on an export basis, such as the automobile industry, electrical apparatus, industrial and agricultural machinery, and other mass production industries, which get no assistance from the tariff but are actually injured by it. Many others are engaged in industries of a distinctly domestic character not subject to foreign competition.¹¹

America is in its present depressed economic condition, Professor James E. Boyle of Cornell University contends, because we insist on practicing economic nationalism while our factories and farms are geared for economic internationalism. We export normally from our farms, Boyle states, 20 percent of our wheat, 35 percent of our lard, 40 percent of our tobacco, and 60 percent of our cotton. Our principal cotton state, Texas, exports normally 90 percent of her cotton. The same rule applies for our industries. For example, we export normally 25 percent of our sewing machines, 20 percent of our agricultural implements, 12½ percent of our cash registers, 12½ percent of our automobiles, and 50 percent of our copper. In other words, the doctrine of economic nationalism, if carried out fully in the United States, would close hundreds of mines, thousands of factories and farms, greatly increase the relief rolls, and prolong and accentuate the depression.¹² But we cannot expect to export unless we import. We cannot sell abroad unless we buy abroad. We must as rapidly as is feasible remove our barriers to imports.

The economic outlook for the United States and the world as a whole seems dark unless the United States adopts a program of economic internationalism. Peter Molyneaux, editor of *The Texas Weekly* and eminent authority on international economic affairs, returning home after participating as one of the American delegates in the Carnegie Endowment Conference on Economic and Monetary Problems held in London in March, declares that he is

¹¹Ibid., p. 5

¹²See Business and Agricultural page of *The Dallas News*, April 6, 1935.

more convinced than ever that among the chief obstacles to world economic recovery, including our own, are the commercial and monetary policies of the United States. He makes the following statements concerning world recovery in the April 6 issue of *The Texas Weekly*.¹³

"It was my good fortune during my short stay abroad to talk with many of the leading economists and authorities on finance and international affairs in the world. I found almost universal agreement among them that the reestablishment of a stable monetary standard is absolutely essential to the restoration of normal economic conditions in all countries. But I also found a practically general belief that unless the creditor nations, the United States and Great Britain, adopt commercial policies which make possible the settlement of international obligations in goods and services, the maintenance of a stable international monetary standard will be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible . . . The reestablishment of a stable international monetary standard and the lowering of trade barriers provide the only way out of the present condition of international chaos . . ."

Mr. Molyneux, when addressing the 1935 Institute of Public Affairs of Southern Methodist University on economic nationalism as a cause of the South's cotton crisis, forcefully stated that the American commercial policy has never concerned itself very seriously about increasing and maintaining exports; it has concerned itself chiefly with limiting imports. He went on to say that our commercial policy has never been greatly concerned about expanding the sale of American goods abroad; it has been chiefly concerned about limiting the sale of foreign goods at home.¹⁴

A glance at the economic practices of the United States during the nineteen twenties seems appropriate at this point. The whole history of this decade bears witness to the fact that the United States lost no opportunity to sell its commodities to promote its economic interests abroad. Hundreds of able young men were sent over the world to carry the message of American trade benefits. The sole function of these trade agents was to stir up business for

¹³See *The Texas Weekly*, April 6, 1935, p. 7.

¹⁴See *Proceedings of Second Conference, The Cotton Crisis*, pp. 45-46.

American industries.¹⁵ Every year American trade with the rest of the world mounted. It was measured in billions. Millions of tons of American merchandise left American shores every year, and billions of dollars were invested abroad. But by the end of the twenties it became apparent that there was a flaw in the magic formulae somewhere. The Crash came, and six years later the United States finds that about all that remains from the golden era is a load of bad debts. The trouble was that America tried to do that which is economically impossible—namely, to sell to the entire world its farm products and industrial products without buying much in return. For a time, American capitalists lent the world the money to buy American products, but when the capitalists were no longer willing to make loans, the whole structure tumbled to the ground.¹⁶

Our business and political leaders since the World War have not appreciated the economic significance of the fact that the United States was a creditor rather than a debtor nation. They have not understood that in order to be paid the principal and interest owed us from abroad we needed to import more goods than we exported. Our tariff walls should have been drastically lowered. But instead of reducing our protective tariff, we actually increased them, particularly in 1930. The advancing of tariff duties by the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 rendered impossible the export of our agricultural and industrial products, and intensified the depression.

II

The broad problem now confronting the American people for solution, therefore, is; Shall we attempt to exchange that which we produce most efficiently or which others lack for goods which others produce most efficiently or which we lack; or Shall we attempt to reorganize our domestic life in such away as to become almost entirely economically self-sufficient? The first plan leads to economic internationalism, the latter to economic isolation. The way to stability and safety seems to be to adopt a policy of economic internationalism.

According to Sir Arthur Salter, if America turns her back on economic internationalism and closes her frontiers to imports, the conclusion is inevitable. Her future trade will consist of the ex-

¹⁵See David S. Muzzey, "The Significance of American Imperialism," in *The American Observer*, April 8, 1935, p. 8.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 8.

change of commodities like cotton for commodities like rubber. The one will balance the other. There will be no balance out of which the outside world can make payments in respect to past loans and investments. There will be no balance out of which the outside world can buy American manufactured products, and American exports of these articles therefore not only be reduced but practically terminated. Machinery, steel, automobiles, etc., will be confined to the national market. The business based upon foreign lending and foreign investments will also be doomed to destruction. These interests represent a substantial proportion of America's total economic activity. If the exports of all manufactured goods as well as capital is stopped altogether, great distress and impoverishment must result as all those engaged in them lose their purchasing power. What is true of America is increasingly true of other countries in so far as their resources are less and their external trade is a greater proportion of their total economic activities.¹⁷

In conclusion it must be stated that a survey of world affairs reveals to the observer a highly intricate and very interdependent economic structure. Wars and business depressions are tragedies that are no longer local but are world-wide in their scope. The close interdependence of all parts of the world has made the action of each nation a matter of concern to all the rest. Nations attempt to adjust their differences through discussions, through diplomatic correspondence, and by conferences. Despite the efforts of international economic conferences and organizations like the League of Nations and the World Court, each is endeavoring to further its own interests, to restrain its imports and to expand its exports, to secure the maximum gain from its own resources—until the result will be collective suicide.¹⁸

In many respects economic nationalism is now stronger than ever before. With restrictions on the movement of people, of commodities, and investments increasing rather than diminishing, it would be foolish to indulge in dreams of a Utopian international economic system. State dominance is gaining ground in varying degrees in all countries, and national feeling has been intensified. In fact, a survey of the world scene is not encouraging to the lover of peace. A race is now on between those economic influences

¹⁷See *Contemporary Problems In The United States*, op. cit., p. 244.

¹⁸See Ernest Minor Patterson, "World Economics," in *The Annals*, Vol. 162, July, 1932, pp. 170-176.

that make for war, and those that help to assure peace. No one can foresee the outcome, but it is clear that if economic nationalism is continued for long, it will greatly increase the possibility of international conflict.¹⁹ The economic basis for war will exist so long as trade barriers and exchange restrictions are erected and imposed as they are today. According to George T. Hughes, brilliant financial writer, the cause of peace would be advanced more by the establishment of fair ratios between the currencies of the nations, and such concessions by each of them as may be necessary to re-establish the normal exchange of goods, than by any kind of anti-war-profit legislation.²⁰

If the nations of the world are to shift from the prevailing policy of economic nationalism to that of economic internationalism, contends Sir Arthur Salter, the following interdependent conditions must be established. First, a political system which secures peace and confidence in the maintenance of peace. Second, a credit system, based on that confidence, which will secure the well-directed and regular flow of capital where it can be productively used. Third, a monetary system, which will give a reasonable, stable medium of exchange. Fourth, a commercial policy which will insure a sufficiently moderate and stable *level of tariffs* to permit the regular flow of world trade.²¹

A general acceptance of the conditions under which economic internationalism is possible would mean a revival of world trade and prosperity, the lessening of the likelihood of war, and greater economic and political security. On the other hand, if the nations of the world continue their present policy of economic nationalism, we can expect a lower level of prosperity for all countries than would otherwise be possible, an increased hazard of war, and greater economic and political insecurity.²²

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 179-180.

²⁰See news article by George T. Hughes in *The Dallas News*, April 8, 1935.

²¹See *Contemporary Problems in the United States*, op. cit., p. 245.

²²*Ibid.*, pp. 244-245.

BOOK REVIEWS

EDITED BY O. DOUGLAS WEEKS
The University of Texas

Sharfman, I. L., *The Interstate Commerce Commission*, Part III, Volume A (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1935, pp. xii, 684)

Those who are familiar with Professor Sharfman's scholarly treatment of the legislative basis of the Interstate Commerce Commission's authority and the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction in two previous volumes will welcome the publication of the first volume of the third part of his study. The author's purpose in Part III is an analysis and appraisal of "the substantive direction of the Commission's performance in each of the major fields" of its activity. In this volume the valuation project and the control of organization and finance are considered, leaving for a future volume the record of the regulation of rates and charges.

The same qualities of thorough research, logical presentation, and careful appraisal which characterized the previous parts of this study are maintained in this section of the work. The author's approach has been founded on an appreciation of the positive elements in Congressional purposes, the interrelation of the various aspects of the Commission's activity, and the inseparability for purposes of discussion of statutory policy, legal doctrine and administrative process. From this broad approach each aspect of the valuation process and the control of organization and finance has been considered. And in each case two objectives have been constantly before the author: first, to show the considerations which have governed the Commission in its tasks; and second, to evaluate the Commission's performance. It is the author's critical attitude and constant appraisal that gives significance to the study. The author is cautious in his commendations and criticisms, but never dodges his declared purpose of giving an estimate of the Commission's performance.

Certain general features of the Commission's work are apparent throughout the volume. The Commission's performance is distinctly the result of flexible approach. Its achievement is limited by the fact that it "does not deal *de novo* with ideal situations" (p. 545). Its performance must be the result, in a variety of situations, of the balancing of considerations. In such a process there are occasions for differences of judgement among commis-

sioners, and the importance of the dominant viewpoint of the regulator is clearly revealed in the opposed attitudes of Commissioners Eastman and Woodlock on the control of railroad finance. The nature of the Commission's powers also has a determining influence on its performance. Most of its powers in regard to finance and organization have been permissive rather than mandatory; and the results have depended, therefore, on outside initiative.

Professor Sharfman begins his discussion of the valuation project with a statement that this task is largely a new one. His purpose is not to discuss the mysteries of valuation doctrine, but to show "the degree of intelligence, resourcefulness, soundness, and effectiveness with which the Commission" has functioned (p. 123). The conclusion is reached that "viewed in its entirety, the Commission's performance seems worthy of highest commendation" (p. 314). Nevertheless, the Commission is criticized concerning a number of aspects of its work, particularly for its original failure to follow the clear mandate of the statute to estimate among other things original cost of construction and for the unscientific manner in which intangible elements of value were estimated. The O'Fallon Case is deservedly given full consideration and the author concludes with an emphasis on "the outstanding need" for a "Congressional enunciation of a standard of value" (p. 318).

While the author believes, that on the whole, the Commission's performance in the control of finance and organization has been creditable, the analysis of the separate aspects of this control makes inevitable the author's conclusion that "the Commission has not fully exploited its opportunities for meritorious reform" in this field (p. 623). In many instances the fundamental differences in attitude between Commissioners Eastman and Woodlock, differences concerning the degree to which public control should impinge upon private management, have been revealed. The Commission has usually taken a "conservative middle ground" (p. 528), has shown "marked restraint" (p. 565). Although it has rejected Commissioner Woodlock's philosophy in particular aspects of control (see page 551), it has given "ampler occasion for dissenting expressions by Commissioner Eastman than by Commissioner Woodlock" (p. 619). In spite of creditable performance in important respects, it has throughout "merely applied the approved standards of non-regulated business" (p. 622).

Many will think that the author's criticisms of the Commission's attitudes in the control of finance and organization are milder than his review of its activities warrant. He has emphasized at

points the extenuating circumstances which partially explain the lack of positive control. On the other hand, viewing the conditions of the 1930's, the author thinks a more "vigorous and forward-looking employment of public authority" can be reasonably supported. The value of the study is enhanced by the treatment at appropriate places of relevant changes in legislative policy in the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933, and the book bears witness of certain inadequacies in past legislative policy and administrative performance.

The University of Texas

EMMETTE S. REDFORD

Strong, Edward K., Jr., *The second-Generation Japanese Problem*. (Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1934. pp. viii, 292.)

This book is designed to set forth for the general public the chief conclusions of three more specialized and detailed studies of the Japanese in California. These studies were made in response to a grant to investigate "the educational and occupational opportunities offered to American citizens of Oriental races." This particular volume first presents the problems in the historical setting of Japanese immigration and settlement in the United States, and against the background of race prejudice with the resulting reactions against the Japanese. The chapter on race prejudice is worthy of special recommendation. A study of population changes among the Japanese in California was made through a survey which included over nine thousand individuals; the results of the survey succeed rather well in destroying most of the popular illusions concerning increases among the Japanese population in this country. Tests of various kinds given to attain a more scientific estimate of the relative physical and mental abilities of Japanese and Caucasians pointed to the existence of only relatively insignificant differences between the two groups, other than a difference in physical strength. Even on the basis of the evidence presented by Dr. Strong, his tentative conclusion that the Japanese seem to be somewhat deficient in linguistic ability might be called into question. (cf. pp. 195-196) The last one hundred pages deal more specifically with the educational and occupational accomplishments of the Japanese in California and with the outlook for the second-generation Japanese along these lines.

There seems to be considerable repetition throughout the book and a number of inconsistencies were noted—e. g., the Japanese are referred to as a self-contained group and it is also pointed out

why they cannot be self-contained; the problem of the second-generation Japanese is said to be no different from the problem of any second-generation immigrant group, yet throughout the book it appears that the second and later generations of Japanese face inescapable identification with an out-group and all the attendant difficulties surrounding that fact under the existing social situation. Short quotations from some of the white investigators who used Japanese interpreters in securing their data raised a question in the reviewer's mind as to how objective some of them were in their approach and what probable effects this may have had upon the results. A few inconsistencies were noted in the statistics and the conclusions drawn from them (*cf.* p. 46 and p. 133; p. 220 and p. 221), but on the whole they appear to be quite reliable. In a field where so little beyond popular impression has existed, the data in this volume are a welcome contribution.

It is when the author goes beyond his data to make recommendations to the second-generation Japanese with references to economic and cultural adjustment in the United States, that he is least scientific and on questionable grounds. Here as elsewhere in the volume the author reveals that he along with others continues to consider American citizens of Oriental ancestry as outsiders. Most second-generation Japanese will doubtlessly resent the point of view that they should remain a distinct cultural group and thus by presenting a close-at-hand contrast to general American culture provide variety for the whites and thereby stimulate the processes of social evolution. The inclusion of a number of case studies of second-generation Japanese, wherein they would speak for themselves, would probably have added much insight to the statistical data presented in the book as well as bringing their problems out in sharper relief and in a more readable manner. In spite of the apparent weight of criticisms the reviewer feels that this is quite a valuable contribution to the study of people of Oriental ancestry in America and recommends it to the student of race relations, to those who work with this group, and to the general reader.

C. E. GLICK

The University of Texas.

Ogg, Frederick A. and Ray, P. Orman, *Introduction to American Government*. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company 1935, pp. viii, 923)

Beard, Charles A., *American Government and Politics*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935, pp. viii, 859)

Patterson, C. Perry, and Guthrie, William B., *American Government, Briefer Edition*. (New York: D. C. Heath and Company, 1935, pp. xiv, 589)

These revisions of well established, standard texts are to be welcomed as bringing up to date the facts and processes of the American governmental system in its popularly called New Deal setting. In each, as in previous editions, the division into federal, state, and local government has been retained with the method of treatment basically the same although the emphasis has been changed somewhat in recognition of the issues presented by the attempts of government to deal with the economic crisis.

In their fifth edition—replacing a fourth edition published in 1931—Professors Ogg and Ray have condensed somewhat the general and historical background and, by adding a separate chapter, have expanded the consideration of civil rights to change moderately the nature of Part I dealing with the foundations of our governmental system. In Part 2, chapters dealing with the executive departments have been broken up and their contents distributed among others concerned with the functions and activities of the national government and expanded in number and content, so as to present New Deal developments in their relations to what has existed in the past. Marginal topical headings and extensive reading lists at the end of each chapter as well as numerous charts in connection with state and local government have been retained.

Dr. Beard's seventh edition—replacing a sixth edition published in 1931—continues "to emphasize the social forces which condition or determine governmental forms and actions and the functions undertaken by government." Some details on the technical functions of government have been removed to make room for a fuller discussion of the changes associated with the New Deal which have been described in their relation to the older ideas and practices. As an aid to the student in reading and reviewing, each chapter has been divided into parts with italicized headings and, in addition, paragraph titles in bold face type have been introduced. Reading references continue to follow each chapter.

American Government, Briefer Edition is a revision by Professor Guthrie of Patterson's larger *American Government* (Revised 1933) and is designed not only to bring up to date the latter treatment in the light of changes in the last two years but also—and this is the prime objective—to condense the material so as to have a text more suitable for a one-semester course. The New Deal is given only passing attention on the assumption that it is too early to conclude what its effects on the functioning of various governmental organs will be. The 840 pages of text of the larger book have been reduced to 529 in the briefer edition which has the same organization as the former except that the first four chapters have been consolidated to form an Introduction, and separate chapters on the National Civil Service, Municipal Organization, and The Re-organization of County Government have been omitted; questions based to some extent on recommended readings have been added to each chapter; and a list of law cases and the text of the Articles of Confederation have been included in the Appendix. Naturally, some completeness of treatment and clarity of expression have been sacrificed to stay within the scope of this briefer approach, but students and teachers will find it preferable to the larger edition in the short survey course with its necessary limitations.

HOWARD A. CALKINS

The University of Texas

Everett, Samuel, *Democracy Faces the Future*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935, pp. x, 269).

Assiduous readers of daily newspapers and of the periodical press in America are no doubt fairly well informed of the need for a renovated governmental machine. We have been admonished time and time again to avoid the danger of allowing the dead hand of the past to hold us in the grip of a fatal inertia. Incessantly the reader is reminded that new political philosophy and modern agencies of government are necessary to a new world. We are informed that the new era in which we now find ourselves is one filled with new socio-economic realities.

Mr. Everett, in this volume, tells us that the United States has succeeded in doing a Herculean task in placing emphasis on science and technology, but he does not hesitate to state that little thought or energy has been devoted to the satisfaction of esthetic desires. He asserts that "the economic destiny of America has been guided by

four institutions: private property, private profit, freedom of contract, and freedom of competition." This being the case tremendous concentration of wealth has developed which has hindered rather than furthered high standards of education, health, housing, and general welfare of the great masses. Economic forces have developed, which, if permitted to go unrestrained, will destroy those social values which should be democracy's justification and purpose. Social control must be established over our individualistic economic institutions if American industrial society is to prosper. It is socio-economic planning on a wide scale that appeals to Mr. Everett.

The author contends that democracy can face the future fearlessly if it will recast itself to meet the needs of a modern society. The following political principles he believes modern industrialism requires as a basis for an adequate governmental structure: "1. A bill of economic rights; i. e., the right to work, the right to a living wage, to free medical care, to economic security in old age, to consumership information, and the like; 2. Rapid functioning of governmental machinery; 3. Functional and proportional representation; 4. Executive dominance of government; 5. Pragmatic justice which is partial; 6. Property, profit, contract, and competition conceived from the point of view of the rights of society; 7. A planning economy; 8. The new nationalism and new internationalism" (p. 155).

Mr. Everett, apparently would be in total agreement with Jefferson when he said, ". . . that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times."

To the reviewer, the volume carries somewhat an air of optimism throughout. Although neither in subject matter nor in thought is there a great deal new to be found in the study, it is always interesting to look at the current scene through the eyes of another. The chapter dealing with Democracy, Business, and Pressure Groups and the one treating Democracy—Fact and Myth are both especially interesting.

STAURT A. MACCORKLE

The University of Texas

Anderson, Sherwood, *Puzzled America*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935, pp. xvi, 287)

Of all the public commentators, Sherwood Anderson can more quickly, and with less ado, put his finger upon an exposed nerve of the body politic. It is a knack that few have, and the professional savant least of all. The latter knows too much; he sees the forests at the expenses of the struggling sapling. And this is a shortcoming of no circumstantial proportions. Anderson observes the properties of minutiae and formulates his generalizations from those data. His is a microcosmic perspective. His generalizations will never be more accurate than the inductive method. But he will be able to probe suffering and want where the professional and "scientific" investigator will scratch only the surface. In the end, the inimitable storyteller will be more effective than cogent, more potent than accurate, more persuasive and impelling than "scientific."

Armed with his insistent obsession of putting his nose into other people's business, the author of "Winesburg Ohio" has invaded the South, interviewing radicals, reds, conservatives, mill-owners, mill-workers, farmers, tenants and preachers. Always he challenges them with embarrassing questions, which, because of his aggravated naivete, they answer without really realizing their indiscretion. Mill-owners told him things that they would have hidden from corporation directors or captains of coal-and-iron police. Labor leaders confessed to acts for which they might be jailed for the remainder of their natural lives, if, indeed, they escaped the righteous mobs of Greensboro or Gastonia.

Anderson sees a new class rising in the South, different from any class that has ever emerged in America. He doesn't quite know how to describe it. It is religious to the point of fanaticism; it is proletarian with all of the prejudices of the early Nineteenth Century bourgeoisie. It is conscious of its exploitation, but it can't quite generate a sufficient hate against the exploiters for effective use. The country at large deprecates the rise and power of the Longs, Bilbos, Russells, Talmadges, and Vardamans, but it doesn't realize the provocation that lies behind their successful careers. It is not sheer ignorance; it is impatience, and a hope that God will intervene for the erasure of those conditions that have led to the brutalization of millions. If one will understand these Southern demagogues, he will not judge them by the standards of Minnesota or Nebraska. Floyd Olson and Huey Long are as different as

Lenin and Mussolini. We pay the price of easy and comfortable generalization.

In the past forty years, a new class of landowners has emerged in the South. Anderson sees it and comments upon it. The traditional paternalists are rapidly disappearing. Their successors drive hard bargains, take their profits, and let the croppers live as best they may. Hate is coming into the picture. A share cropper, white or black, couldn't reasonably hate a proprietor who accepted the responsibility of protecting the tenant against starvation. The murk clears! This new agrarian proletariat hates the new Yankeesque owner, but, different from the socialist proletariat, it wants land of its own. Long will never join with Norman Thomas to reform the United States. In the unremote future, I predict, the Longs and Bilbos will be demanding the dissolution of the large Tidewater estates.

Anderson provokes thought. That, too, is his habit. He has written a more significant book than "Puzzled America."

CORTEZ A. M. EWING

University of Oklahoma

Abbott, Lyndon E., *A Manual of Tax Collection Procedure for Texas Cities*. (Austin: The University of Texas, Bureau of Municipal Research, Study No. 2, 1935, pp. 107.)

Texas towns and cities have built up a debt structure amounting to approximately one-half billion dollars. The responsibility for the liquidation of this great debt is placed upon the property taxpayers of the towns and cities. Approximately 40 per cent of the total municipal tax collections is now used for debt charges. This fact has made it necessary for the city officials to give serious and intelligent thought to the problems of tax collection procedure. For those who are beset by knotty problems of taxation growing out of collection, delinquency, and popular indifference to the financial needs of the Texas city, Mr. Lyndon E. Abbott, staff member of the Bureau of Municipal Research of the University of Texas, has prepared an excellent manual on tax collection procedure.

The author, in making this study, selected fifty-eight typical Texas cities from which he collected by means of a questionnaire and personal visits detailed information relative to collection procedure. This information was arranged and organized into four main divisions, namely, the organization for tax administration, current tax collection, delinquent tax collection, and special devices

for collection. Mixed throughout the arrangement of facts, the author has presented many sound observations on municipal taxation as a whole. He had, apparently, prepared himself for this Texas study by making a thorough study of municipal taxation in other states.

The topic sentence of each major thought which the author develops is written in italics. This enables the reader to keep in his mind in an organized manner the main points of the manual. The fifth chapter presents an excellent summary of the whole study. There are sixteen exhibits showing facsimile reproductions of various tax forms, plans, and letters used by different cities in their tax collection procedure. A five page appendix gives a brief summary of collection procedure of revenues other than taxes.

The reviewer feels that the author has accomplished the purpose for which this study was made, namely, "to outline the fundamental principles of collection which a city should follow to increase its income from ad valorem taxes and to assist the collector in carrying out the duties of his office." One has the feeling that certain parts of the study would have been more valuable had they been more fully developed, but when it is considered that the entire study is compressed within 107 pages, it is easy to understand why every feature could not be fully developed.

SAM B. McALISTER

North Texas State Teachers College

Kneier, Charles M., *City Government in the United States*. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1934, pp. v, 482.)

The volume at hand is designed for use in college courses which pay exclusive, or almost exclusive, attention to the general government and the "politics" of the city. Its author expresses the hope in the preface that it will be found satisfactory as a textbook in (1) those institutions where a single course is taught in municipal government and (2) those in which a year is given to the subject, the first semester to government and the second to administration. The plan of the book keeps steadily in mind the limitations set by the ends sought, with the result that only two chapters are concerned with administration proper.

The other twenty-four treat of most of the familiar problems of municipal government, though not too much in the familiar way. There is, for example, little of the history of municipalities and municipal government—too little, some doubtless would say.

On the other hand, there is an adequate discussion of the position of the city in our political system. Along with and inseparable from this discussion is an examination of the legal character of the municipal corporation. Further, there are eight excellent chapters on the various problems which relate to popular participation in municipal affairs. The author opens with the statement that he desires "to present the government of American cities as a problem in democracy." This he succeeds admirably in doing. Following these chapters are four on the structure of municipal government. Two subjects usually either ignored altogether or passed over lightly are considered at the length of a chapter each; one is "Urban Representation in State Legislatures," the other "The Integration of Local Governments." Each chapter concludes with a list of "Suggested Readings." The books and articles listed here constitute a very good bibliography on municipal government. A complete index adds much to the volume.

Professor Kneier has planned carefully and executed well a book which provides a fresh approach to the subject with which it deals. Moreover, he has achieved the purposes which, according to his prefatory statement, he set out to achieve. But best of all, he has written a usable, readable book. *City Government in the United States* is not characterized by that loneliness of excellence which has been the reward of some authors, but it is one of the best textbooks in a field in which there are, by common consent, many first class works.

ROSCOE C. MARTIN

The University of Texas

Chamberlain, Rudolph W., *There Is No Truce*. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935, pp. vi, 420).

The unmistakable concentrations of corporate economy that featured the last half of the nineteenth and the first quarter of the twentieth centuries naturally produced flaming spirits who gave of their lives and their substance to breast the tide. One may pick out these figures—now canonized as martyrs by the liberal dispensation—and attribute a glorious prescience to them. Muck-rackers, literati, reformers, old age of reason men and women! But the steam-roller of the success philosophy left them unfortunate victims to the fascism of greed. Thomas Matt Osborne was one of these doughty figures. Always a sentimentalist, he nevertheless refused to heed the theme song of the success herd. There were evidences of worthwhileness other than money. Besides, he

was born to an aristocratic position, with more money than he could prudently invest.

In this study of the crusades of Osborne—and Mr. Chamberlain has outdone mere excellence—there lies the pregnant story of a life-time of thankless tasks. We can determine a man's character better by the men he has hated than by those he has loved. With Osborne this is especially applicable. He hated Hearst, Theodore Roosevelt, Bryan, Charles Murphy, Tammany Hall, the big trusts, and demagogues of whatever section. To him, Hearst was a flamboyant intellectual corruptionist, who would outrage the goddess of purity for the sake of personal power and position. The elder Roosevelt conspired with Satan for the furtherance of his own daemon. Bryan was an ignoramus come to the councils of the powerful, a bull in a Wedgewood closet, a shyster with alluring phrases and quack remedies. One was never at a loss to know where "T. M." stood upon a public issue. And therein lies the explanation of his persistent political failure.

I have not stressed his battle for prison reform. That is already generally known. Yet one may gather in these continuously surprising pages a clear picture of the hopeless struggle which he fought to ward off the political boodlers. It is a sordid chapter in American ethics, and Osborne emerges as one of the real purificationists. He becomes a bigger figure every year, as men like Harry Elmer Barnes continue to press for public decency in the management of penal institutions.

CORTEZ A. M. EWING

University of Oklahoma

Martin, Roscoe C., *The Defendant and Criminal Justice*. (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1935, pp. 264).

Many studies have been made in recent years of the judicial process as it pertains to the administration of criminal justice which deal primarily with the various steps of a case from the moment of arrest to the imposition of the penalty. Other social scientists have started at this point in dealing with the subject of penology and the rehabilitation of the criminal. In the study under review there is still a different approach to the general subject of criminal justice in the collection and analysis of data concerning the accused himself. It is not primarily a study of the criminal but of the social groups of which he is a member. The data are assembled around such factors as sex, age, race, place of birth, residence, marital status, family connections and responsibilities, economic

situation, education, political, religious, and fraternal affiliations—factors which go to determine his place in the community and his standing in the society which is accusing him of violating some obligation owed to it. It deals with the accused as a human being and how he is looked upon and treated by the courts and juries and not with the machinery of the law.

While the study is limited to the state of Texas and in some instances presents insufficient data for wide generalizations, it opens up an interesting approach to a type of study which can well be made in all localities. The value of this type of study is in showing how human our criminal process is, "that we are neither children nor gods but men in a world of men, and that often the law fails in strict justice, not because our judges and prosecuting officers are lacking in the desire to render it, but because of the human prejudices which we all possess and the inarticulateness of many members of our so-called lower classes," and of the helplessness of the stranger or one who speaks an alien language.

One is impressed in this study with the absence of any attempt to draw conclusions except where the facts seem sufficiently clear to justify those conclusions. Indeed, where the facts do not justify conclusions, the author has either permitted them to speak for themselves, or their insufficiency has been pointed out. The diagrams and tables of data are very understandable.

Social scientists will discover in *The Defendant and Criminal Justice* a study well worth while.

GLENN McCLEARY

University of Missouri

Fite, Warner, *The Platonic Legend* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934, pp. vii, 331.)

There is nothing more irritating to the ordinary mortal than to sit helplessly aside and witness the destruction of immortality or, at least, the idea of it. Many have been taught that Plato represents perfection. Skepticism was no more applicable to that ideal person than to the Sermon on the Mount. Now Plato is being demolished, and without benefit of the clergy that he never anticipated.

For its astonishment value, Warner Fite has written a truly amazing book. He strips the scholastic verbiage from the Platonic legend and quotes from Plato's own words to confute his sentimental admirers. Especially does our respected late authority, Prof. Benjamin Jowett, come in for some ruthless criticism. It

appears that the old Oxonian was unconsciously moved to reconstruct Plato with all the virtues of a Nineteenth Century English Victorian gentleman. Bernard Bosanquet is not spared; and the same is true of Professors Taylor, Woodbridge and Shorey.

In the first place, according to Mr. Fite, it appears that Plato was a mere amaneunsis for Socrates, who, in turn, was not a very reliable thinker. Else, why did he contradict himself so often? Again, Plato was no yearner for social betterment; he was as snobbish as any other true aristocrat. He hated the Athenian democracy, so he set about, and not very courageously, to advocate the adoption of a bastard Spartanized system. How the democratic evangelists could get inspiration from Plato is beyond comprehension, yet they did it, and to a degree that is truly remarkable.

The author goes through the various phases of the traditional Platonic system. Everywhere he finds contradictions between the original documents and the modern interpretations. In a brilliantly written chapter—"The Mathematical Mind"—the author has discussed the origin and nature of Plato's thought. It was worshipful of mathematical accuracy and innocent of any human considerations. "The task of life is then forever a matter of getting back again to the norm, or reducing the sum of our human sins and aberrations to the slightest possible mean variation from the mathematical point that marks the eternal order." (p. 259) Perfection is, therefore, geometric perfection.

CORTEZ. A. M. EWING

University of Oklahoma

Morris, Albert, *Criminology*. (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1934, pp. xii, 590.)

In this quite readable and suggestive text on criminology Professor Morris, of Boston University, has departed from the all too frequent formal, institutional approach used in texts in this field; his emphasis is placed more upon personalities and the interaction between personalities—the personalities of criminals, of those with whom criminals associate, and of those who attempt to deal with criminals.

Another feature which the author keeps before the student is the necessity of maintaining the distinction between criminals and prisoners. The conception of the criminal, however, seems to the reviewer to be too narrow in that more of a legal than sociological conception is followed.

After three introductory chapters on "Criminals and their Relation to Society," six interesting ones are devoted to the natural history of criminals. The student is here given a vivid insight into factors which at different stages of personality growth contribute to the development of criminality and the criminal habit. Several excerpts from cases are included, but in view of the desire of the author to emphasize the personality approach, it is felt that presentation of more extensive personal documents would have added to the value of the text.

A section is then inserted on methods of preventing criminal behavior. The last two parts of the book are devoted to an analysis of the apprehension, conviction and treatment of those whose criminal behavior has not been successfully prevented. Here the student will find a straightforward, provocative analysis of our institutions of social control as they affect those who have become or are likely to become criminals, together with what seem to be sound recommendations for improvement. At the end of the volume there are twenty-six pages of topics for discussion, subjects for reports and exercises, followed by a thirty-two-page bibliography of well selected books and articles. Teachers will probably find this to be one of the most usable texts in the field, students and laymen should find it lively and thought-provoking reading.

C. E. GLICK

The University of Texas

BOOK NOTES

The National Association of Housing Officials, Chicago Illinois, has presented a brief but practicable manual of procedure in its *Public Housing Surveys—An Outline of Survey and Planning Procedure for Low-Cost Housing* (March, 1934, pp. 20) by Edmund H. Hoben. The study is prefaced by a statement of housing problems and by an announcement of the services available through facilities of the Association. An outline of the objectives of housing studies precedes a brief analysis of the existing sources of information in this field. The remainder of the pamphlet comprises directions for administering housing surveys. This material is organized under the following headings: sources of personnel for studies, organization of studies, presentation of findings, and general rules for conducting surveys. The value of the publication as a guide for conducting such surveys is increased by

the presentation of six forms to be utilized in actual survey work. A brief bibliography of survey reports and survey methods is included in the pamphlet.

J. T. B.

Government Career Service (The University of Chicago Press, 1935, pp. xiii, 99) is the title under which are published five lectures delivered by Professor Leonard D. White at the University of Chicago in February of 1935. The lectures, by title "Toward a Career Service," "Organization of an Administrative Career Service," "Conditions of Service of an Administrative Career Corps," "Foundations of a Career Service," and "The Doctrine of Loyalty in a Career Service," outline in detail a proposal to institute in the Federal civil service a career system which would rest upon the principles which for years have guided the destinies of the British civil service. The plan applies only to those officials who occupy administrative posts, that is, to those whose duties relate primarily to "supervision, direction, coördination, and, above all, planning for more effective performance of work or for wiser formulations of policy" (page 22). Of these there are not more than 2,500. Notwithstanding the small number of officials involved, the conclusion is voiced that some twenty years would be required to carry the plan into effect. Professor White's proposal is a distinct contribution to current thought on the manifold problems of personnel. It may be that the combined efforts of students of these problems will lead in the next several years to material changes for the better. The present volume points the way to a substantial but not too drastic change in the Federal personnel policy, the adoption of which undoubtedly would constitute a landmark in the development of the American public service.

R. C. M.

In *The Road to Good Government* (Freybourg Printing Company, 1934, pp. 53) Mr. Alphonse H. Kursheedt analyzes the evils under which government labors in America and suggests remedies therefor. As an example of the latter the qualifications specified for the President may be noted. They are "highest principles of honor, progressiveness, a well-balanced mind, deliberateness, intelligence, open-mindedness, ability to accomplish, and astuteness." "Undesirable characteristics" are "lack of the above qualifications, lack of a high sense of honor, an exalted ego,

precipitateness and demagoguery." A suggested amendment to Article II of the national Constitution reads as follows: "No person shall be eligible to the office of President or Vice President who himself owes, or whose wife owes allegiance to or could be prevailed upon by any ruler, potentate or government of a foreign country." No device is suggested for the enforcement of this splendid idea. Pages 33-40 are printed twice, though it cannot be said that this detracts from the value of the publication.

R. C. M.

An important service to students of local government has been performed by Professor William Anderson in his pamphlet, *The Units of Government in the United States* (Public Administration Service, Publication No. 42, Chicago, 1934, pp. 38) which has been issued by the Public Administration Service. In defining the term, "unit of government," the author sets a standard which may be conveniently used in counting the total number of units of government in this country. In accord with his definition, Professor Anderson finds that over one hundred and seventy-five thousand areas of government in the United States may be appropriately classified as "units." In addition to describing the existing situation in Part I, the author discusses clearly in Part II the question of the most desirable size of local government units in line with existing economic and social facts and in Part III the question of the most desirable number of local governmental units. The value of such research is enhanced by a number of interesting tables and figures which present cogently the problem of "layers of government" in this country.

J. A. B.

Fernando Márquez Miranda's *Ensayo sobre Los Artífices de la Platería en el Buenos Aires Colonial* (Imprenta de la Universidad, Buenos Aires, 1933, pp. 235, LXXXIII, 10 plates) is one of those scholarly monographs (No. 62) of the Institute of Historical Investigations of the University of Buenos Aires. It is probably the completest account of the organization, technique, and output of the silver workers' guilds of Buenos Aires which were so prosperous and active in colonial times. The work is not confined to patterns and workmanship (central as they are), but also gives a very interesting picture of the human side of this artistic pursuit, and especially of the numerous rivalries and conflicts of the guilds. The festivals of the workers and of the mer-

chants are also described. The guilds are portrayed as an integral phase of the life of the city.

L. L. B.

An interesting collection of outstanding events in the history of Venezuela is presented in José E. Machado's *El Dia Histórico* (Tipografía Americana, Caracas, pp. 450). The *Universal*, leading daily of Caracas, solicited these sketches from the historian and printed them in its columns, one for each day from October 1, to June 30. While most of the sketches have a highly personal, and frequently an emotional, reference, as befits their place of original publication, they also illustrate graphically some of the most important social and political events in the history of the people. The book would therefore be useful either as historical source material or for practice reading in Spanish.

L. L. B.

What Policemen Should Know (published by Francis Basuino, New York, 1934) is the title of a volume of almost 400 pages by James J. Skehan. The book does not attempt to deal with the more technical aspects of police administration, but addresses itself rather to the practical problems with which the police officer should be familiar. Its author, a retired police captain of the New York City department, a former instructor in the Police Academy of New York City, and author of other writings in the field of police work, is amply qualified to perform the task which he set for himself, namely, that of preparing a handbook for police officers. The volume would have profited materially from a more careful reading of proof, but its value for policemen in its present shape is not to be denied.

R.C. M.

The fourth edition of Professor Robert Eugene Cushman's *Leading Constitutional Decisions* (New York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1935, pp. xiii, 432) has just appeared from the press, previous editions having appeared in 1925, 1929, and 1932. The cases included in the first edition still remain. Of the eight additional cases published in the appendix of the third edition three have been deleted and new cases added to make a total of thirteen, among which are *Norris v. Alabama*, *Rathbun v. U. S.*, *Nebbia v. New York*, *Schechter v. U. S.*, *Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company*, *Perry v. U. S.*, and *Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell*. Thus a very useful little volume has been brought up to date. Other important new decisions have been

briefly summarized in notes appended to the new cases named above.

O. D. W.

Perfiles del Saltillo, by Miguel Alessio Robles (Editorial "Cultura," Mexico, D. F., 1933, pp. 139) consists of a baker's dozen of local character and place sketches, giving a pretty accurate and a readable picture of one of Mexico's provincial capitols of the north. In these pages one who knows Mexico may see again the streets with their bare walls of houses, the markets, the churches, the lovely plazas and the people who have their intellectual life and their pleasures in the evening. A number of Mexico's leading poets, novelists, historians and essayists stand out as the author describes them and their work sympathetically. Here too are Carranza and Villa, riding down the main street more than once—Carranza while still a local governor with no thought of the presidency of the nation. It is a book full of local color.

L. L. B.

F. S. Crofts and Company have recently published a revised second edition of J. F. Horrabin's *An Atlas of Current Affairs* (New York: 1935, pp. x, 149). Seventy-four maps in black and white are included illustrating current national and international problems and with a page of descriptive material attached to each. Twenty-five maps are European; ten deal with Mediterranean and Near Eastern questions; the remaining ones are about equally distributed among the Western Hemisphere, the Far East, Russia, India, and Africa. It goes without saying that this type of atlas is unique. It should prove most useful to students of world affairs and it has the additional attraction of being cheap (\$1.00).

O. D. W